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PART ONE

THE PROBLEMATIC WITHIN THE SARTREAN SYSTEM

The Sartrean ontology, presented in

~ei~ ~Nothips

ness, is paradoxical inasmuch as it rests upon two radically
distinct realms of being, which, nevertheless, are totally
bound.

These realms which serve as the ultimate ontological

principles of Sartre's system are:

being-in-itself and being-

for-itself, or "thing" and consciousness, Being and Nothingness.
Yet, while the In-itself and the For-itself function as ultimate
principles, Bartre does not wield them to generate further principles.

Instead, he employs descriptions of concrete human at-

titudes to show that the diverse experiences of man-in-the-world
are but variations upon

ontological theme: the For-itself's
de facto relation to the In-itself. l Consequently, he claims
~

the complete comprehensiveness of the In-itself and the Foritself as ontological principles and thereby repudiates any
need for a deduction of further principles.

But what, pre-

cisely, is Bartre's perspective in developing his philosophy?
IFor Sartre, it is an abstraction to treat of these
principles in isolation from one another. He states:
"It is
not profitable first to separate the two terms of a relation
in order to try to join them together again later. The relation
is a synthesis. • • • The concrete is man within the world
• • • " Being and Nothi~SS (cited hereafter as ml), trans.
by Hazel E. J!arnes (Nework: The Philosophical LIDrary, 1956),
3. The metaphysical import of Sartre's contention that the
For-itself exists only as a relation to the In-itself is the
dominant concern of this thesis.
2

3
How, specifically, does he arrive at his ontological principles
and evince their comprehensiveness?

What is the structure of

these principles?

---................ -

-

----

TIm METHOD .AND STARTING POINT OF SARTRE' S ONTOLOGY

...............

As revealed by the subtitle to Being

~

Nothingness:

"An Essay,!!!. Phenomenological Ontology," Sartre's philosophic
intent is to establish an ontology on phenomenological grounds.
Indicative of this interplay of ontology and phenomenology in
the eyes of Sartre is the very structure of Being
ness.

~

Nothing-

For, the Introduction reveals the In-itself and the For-

itself on the phenomenological ground of the fundamental intentionality of consciouaness and the remaining chapters disclose the Sartrean employment of the phenomenological method to
show the presence and the original relation of these
in basic human situations.

princip~s

Phenomenology's attention to the

concrete as revelatory of fundamental ontological structures,
its descriptive bent and its emphasis upon the basic intentionality of consciousness thus bear heavily upon Sartrean ontology
--an ontology which takes its rise from phenomenological grounds
and returns to phenomenology to evince the comprehensiveness of
its principles.

But, more specifically, how does Sartre's

phenomenological approach reveal the In-itself and the For-itself,
the two distinct regions of being?
To answer this question, we must traverse the rough
terrain of the Sartrean Introduction to Being and Nothingness.

4

In his opening statement, Bartre credits modern thought with
having realized considerable progress by reducing the existent
to the series of appearances which manifest it.

The impetus for

this reduction had been to surmount the prevalent dualisms of
being and appearance, act and potency, essence and appearance.
But, granting that being does not stand behind appearances,
granting that the phenomenal being is nothing more than the connected series of its manifestations according to an essential
law, Bartre questions whether modern thought succeeded in its
attempt to remove all dualisms from a legitimate status within
philosophy.
'c

emerged:

It seems to him, rather, that a new dualism has

the .fini te and the infj.ni te t a dualism which affords

Sartre not only a new interpretation of the former dualisms,
but also a means of access to the two regions of being.

But,

what is this "new dualism"?
The meaning of the Sartrean duality of the finite and
the infinite can perhaps best be grasped by describing a perceptive act.

For example, I am walking down the street and my

eyes rest upon a tree situated off in the distance.

As I first

approach the tree, this mass of greens and browns appears as
though it were an Impressionist painting.

But, as I draw closer,

the mass becomes more defined, takes on its peculiarly distinctive shape.

My attention is drawn to the random arrangement

of the leaves, to their various shades of green, to the multiple
hues within one leaf, to the branch from which it springs, to

5
the asymmetrical disposition

the branches, to the trunk from

o~

which they originate a11.d so on

~ i~initum.

Each appearance of

the tree is transcended by me toward another manifestation withi
the series of appearances which constitute 'tree.'

Then. too,

in walking about the tree, I perceive that the array, the colors
appear novel at each stopping point.

I recognize that if it

were possible for me to stop at each point in this circular path
about the tree and take a point of view on it, each profile
would be unequalled.

Thus, as there are potentially an intini te

number of points within a circle, though the circle be bound,
finite, so, too, are there an infinite number of points of view
it9 be taken on the tree, thol...gh the tree be fin! te.

Because I

am a subJec.lli capable of changing my points of view on the tree,
the finitude of the appearance of the tree is surpassed toward
-infinity.

This, then, is what Sartre means by the dualism of

finite and infinite.
The significance of "the infinite in the finite" for
Sartre's ontology lies in its staging his sole point of departure--the fundamental intentionality of consciousness.
the dualism achieves in two interrelated ways:

This

(1) by reveal-

ing the phenomenal existent as transcendent, and (2) by posing
the problem of the being of the phenomenon through its readmission of the former dualisms.

These pOints, however, require

examination.
Regarding the first, Sartre maintains that the infinite

6

series of manifestations of an object, indicated by the infinite
number of points of view that can be taken on it, reveals the
phenomenon as transcendent.

In other words, the inexhaustibil-

ity of an object, manifested by the inability of a consciousness
to grasp it in its totality, shows that the phenomenon is not a
subjective affectation, but rather is other than consciousness,
independent of consciousness as subject.

Thus, Bartre's state-

ment, leveled against any idealistic position:

"Understand that

our theory of the phenomenon replaced the reality of the thing
by the objectivity of the phenomenon and that it has based this
on an equal to infinity. ,,2

But this appeal to infinity has

another consequence for Bartre's theory of the phenomenon--that
of readmitting the former dualisms which modern thought disclaimed.
Among the dualisms re-entering the legitimate sphere of
philosophy, Bartre avers, is that of potency and act.

Because

the inexhaustibility of an object implies a reference to the
infini te, a certain "potency" returns to inhabit the phenomenon--the "potency" to exhibit an infinite number of manifestations.

This possibility, however, is revealed only because

there is a consciousness capable of taking an infinite number of
points of view on the object.

Hence, "potency" returns to the

phenomenon ~ only 2!! ~ ground

2! intentional activity.3

2BN , xlvii.
3Inasmuch as the major question of this thesis concerns

?
Another dualism readmitted by Sartre is that of essence
and appearance.

Because of the inexhaustibility of an object,

essence is in principle that which must be manifested by an infinite series of individual appearances.

Consequently, essence

is severed from any one appearance which refers to it and a
dualism arises.

Yet, Sartre claims that proceeding from in-

dividual appearances, one "can always determine the essence
which they imply, as a sign implies its meaning.,,4

The sever-

ance of essence from appearance, then, takes the form of a severance of the meaning of a sign from the sign.
sition Sartre concludes:

"The essence is not

is the meaning of the object, • • • ,,5

From which po~

the object; it

But, if essence is not

in the object, what is the source of essence?

Sartre answers,

it is through consciousness that the meaning of an object, its
consciousness as the source of metaphysical categories, it
should be noted that the very appeal to infinity is grounded in
the structure of consciousness. That the finitude of the appearance of an object is surpassed to infinity rests upon the
fact that a subject is capable ot changing points of view on an
object. Thus, the potency-act dualism, together with the other
dualisms to which the infinite-finite duality gives rise, has
consciousness as its ultimate source. This crucial role of the
Sartrean consciousness will also be indicated in the subsequent
discussions of the other dualisms.

4nN, xlix. Via this claim, Sartre, however, retreats
from the IOgical conclusion that the essence of any object cannot be determined inasmuch as the infinite "series itself will
never appear." <![, xlvii).
5BN , xlix.
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essence, comes into the world.

For, he claims, it is only be-

cause a consciousness is in an intentional relation with an object that the object is revealed as structured.

Thus essence

re-enters the philosophic arena in a manner similar to the
readmission of

potency--~~

correlate

2! human intentional

~

tivity ..
There is, however, still another dualism readmitted on
the basis of the infinite-finite duality and thereby on the
ground of the intentional activity of consciousness:
ism of being and appearance.

the dual-

Rejecting a Kantian interpretation

of this dualism, Sartre claims that there is nothing behind the
appearance.
ena appears?

Are we to conclude, then, that the being of phenomInasmuch as we have some grasp of being and can

speak of it, Sartre avers, there must be an appearance of being
and, in fact, being is manifested to us through the immediacy
of lived experience.

Yet, he asks, Itis the being which dis-

closes itself to me, appears to me, of the same nature as the
being of existents which appear to me?tt6

Is the phenomenon of

being identical with the being of phenomena?

Is the appearance

of this page identical with the being of this page?

Granted

that the whiteness of this page appears to me, yet being cannot
be reduced to a simple quality.

Granted that the various qual-

ities of this page refer to an essence, to the meaning of this
object, yet meaning is not identical with being.
6EN xlviii.

-'

That any
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object is in principle inexhaustible, moreover, precludes the
disclosure of the totality of its being.

And yet, it cannot be

said that the object hides its being, since being is not "behind" the qualities which appear.
the being of phenomena?

What, then, can be said of

Simply, that being is the condition of

all revealing and is coextensive with the phenomenon.

That any

object is in principle inexhaustible precludes the reduction of
the being of the phenomenon to the phenomenon of being, and
herein lies the meaning of the dualism of being and appearance
for Bartre.

The being of phenomena, as the condition of reveal-

ing, cannot exist only insofar as it appears.

Thus the being of

phenomena surpasses the knowledge which we have of it and provides the basis for knowledge.

But a problem remains as to the

character of this transphenomenal being.
Sartre's sole point of departure in solving the ontological problem of the transphenomenal being--a departure already
indicated by the structure of the infinite-finite dualism, the
dualism founded upon the former and the transcendent character
of objects revealed by the former--is the fundamental intentionality of consciousness. 7 Adopting the Husserlian thesis
7Inasmuch as the method and starting point of Sartre's
ontology is under consideration, the thesis of James Collins
demands comment. Collins claims that Bartre's ontology rests
upon a twofold option that precedes all his philosophizing:
"Nietzsche's atheistic postulate and Husserl's postulate of a
self-sufficient phenomenology." (Cf. his "Sartre's Postulatory
Atheism," The Existentialists llrateway edition; Chicago: Henry
Regnery Comp~, 1960.J, 46). "In his system, atheism is not

.
10

that "All consciousness is consciousness of something,1I Sartre
wields this thesis in such a way that it is responsive not only
to an elucidation of the transphenomenal regions of being, but
also to the waging of a criticism against the epistemological
stances of realism and idealism. 8 How does Sartre maneuver this
dual play upon his treatment of consciousness?
Seeking ultimately to show the irreducibility of the
being of consciousness and the being of phenomena, Sartre
part of the evidence but a presupposition deliberately laid down
as a determinant of evidence. It (~. ~. t 87). Issue is taken
with the evidence cited by Collins in support of his thesis of
a postulat0rit atheism. The "system" of Sartre
ttsystem" is
presen£ed 0 y in Bei~ and Nothi~ess which in cates solely
the basic intentional~-O? consc~sness as a point of departure. Sartre's declaration O.t atheism, moreover, does not appear
in his novels, essays or plays until after the publication of
~i~ and Nothingness.
There is no evidence, furthermore, that
ar re-a[ose phenomenolo~ in order to dispose of God--a view
which Collins seeks to show (~. cit., 46-48)--particularly in
view of Bartre's utilization or pnenomenology to arrive at the
transphenomenal being of consciousness. Finally, Collins' emphasizing of Nietzsche's atheistic influence upon Sartre, together with his statement that "He permits criticism of Nietzsche
only on those points where the latter ceases to be the prophet
of atheistic existentialism" (~. cit., 50) is highly questionable inasmuch as Sartre, proneto CIte historical influences,
merely mentions Nietzsche twice in Beins and Nothingness (xlvi,
541) and neither of the lnsignifican£ passages refers to an
atheistic context or criticizes Nietzsche. Gilbert Varet points
out the only position which can be internally' evinced in Sartre's
s~stematic work:
"Chez Sartra le point de depart n'est pas la
r allte-n-wnaine, ou l' ex1st~nce 'IOU la mauvaise foi, ou
l'atheisme, mais bien la phenomenologie de Huss~rl,--et d'abord
Son 'acquisition fond~ntale: l'intentionalite'." (Cf.
Ltontolo,ie de Sartra lEaris: Presses Univarsitaires de France,

sat

I94[1, 2.

-

Bvaret points out the general relationship of phenomenology and epistemology in his L'Ontologie de Sartre, 14-25.
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interprets the dictum of Husserl as meaning that "consciousness
has no 'content',,,9 that consciousness is in itself something
other than a knowledge turned back upon itself, that consciousnesS is a positional consciousness of the world.

In other

words, consciousness is such that it goes outside itself to
reach its object.

In being conscious of a tree, one's con-

sciousness is absorbed in the tree.
is not

The tree, Sartre maintains,

!a one's consciousness, not even in the form of an ade-

quate representation.

For, to introduce an object into con-

sciousness would involve introducing an opacity into consciousness because of the inexhaustibility of any object. Such an
introduction would refer to infinity the inventory which- consciousness could make of itself, would "make consciousness a
thing"lO and would thereby deny the Sartrean cogi~..
Sartre I s insistence that consciousness has no content.

Hence
Bu-!;; what

is the Sartrean cogito?
9BN , Ii. Sartre initiates this discussion with a criticism of HUsserl's epistemological and ontological stance. He
claims that while Husserl understood that the foundation of
being for the totality "perceived-perception" could not itself
be subject to the perciii, he erred in concluding that the being
which founds knowledge s the transphenomenal being of consciousness. For, Sartre avers, this conclusion has as its
counterpart the equally erroneous position that the being of the
percipi, of the phenomenon, can be reduced to the being of conscIousness. Yet, while intent upon refuting idealism, Sartre is
equally using Husserl's position to serve the development of the
Sartrean ontology by its introduction of another dimension of
transphenomenal being--that of consciousness.
lO!!, Ii.
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Continuing his manipulation of epistemological concerns
to yield ontological information, Sartre seeks to disclose the
Sartrean cogito by examining the necessary condition for all
knowing consciousnesses.

The prerequisite for all knowing con-

sciousnesses, he cites, is an awareness of being conscious of
something.

This secondary awareness, however, must be implicit

in the primary consciousness, or one should be aware of being
conscious of something and aware of being aware of being conscious of something ad infinitum.

Why an infinite regress?

Because of the subject-object dualism constitutive of any knowing consciousness.

Thus, Sartre maintains that, unless we wish

to admit an infinite regress, "there must be an immediate, noncognitive relation ot the self to itself."ll

There must be a

non-thetic consciousness accompanying and founding avery positional consciousness.
That there

~

such a non-thetic consciousness can,

moreover, be quite simply illustrated.

In playing tennis,

although my positional consciousness is directed toward the
tennis ball, I am nevertheless implicitly aware that I am now
making

a smashing backhand.

Furthermore t it anyone were to ask

me what I was doing, I would immediately reply:
backhand."

What does this response indicate?

it reveals that

my

"Attempting a
First of all,

consciousness as positional is also a re-

flecting consciousness and can posit the instantaneous
ll!lit liii.

13
consciousness as its object.

Secondly, and more strategically,

it veri£ies the existence of those implicit awarenesses which
have passed without being reflected upon and yet condition and
make possible the reflection.

In terms of such evidence as

this, then, Sartre claims the existence of a non-thetic or prereflective consciousness conditioning the thetic Cartesian
cogito.

This non-thetic consciousness, however, is not to be

considered a new consciousness.

Rather, the Sartrean cogito is

onll mode 2!. existence which is possible £££.. !. consciousness of someth1pg,n l2 it is the being of the knower, tla mode of
"~

apprehension which is not a phenomenon of knowledge but is the
structure of being. nl3 Sartrets employment of epistemological
concerns has thus led to the discovery of a transphenomenal
being of consciousness, but Sartre has still to prove the irreducibility of the transphenomenal being of the knower and the
transphenomenal being of phenomena, has still to solve the
problem of the character of the being of phenomena.
In effect, however, the Sartrean repudiation of the
idealist reduction and the Sartrean avowal of the primacy of the
thing perceived over o'ur knowledge of it have already been
staged.

For not only does the transcendent, inexhaustible char-

acter of the object preclude its identification with the knowledge one has of it, but experience also evinces that in knowledge
12m!, live
l3~, lvii.
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the object does not become consciousness and disappear as this
object.

The perceived being is thus cut off from consciousness,

is independent of consciousness in its very being.

Hence the

transphenomenal being which is consciousness can neither found
the phenomenon of being nor be identified with the being of the
phenomenon. 14
Though the pl"eceding conclusion puts to rest the idealist reduction, Sartre formulates an "ontological proof" of the
independent being of the phenomenon,
existential status

~

proof derived from

~

2! consciousness, from the non-thetic cogito.

Utilizing the dictum "all consciousness is consciousness of
something" as the definition of the bein,g of the knower, Sartre
considers two alternative meanings for consciousness.
sciousness can be interpreted either as

consti~~tive

Conof the

being of its object or as, in its innermost nature, a relation
to a transcendent being.

The first interpretation, however, is

fallacious since consciousness of something is consciousness of
an inexhaustible plenitude which consciousness is not,
- as was
previously shown.

That consciousness is consciousness of some-

thing must thus be interpreted in the second way as meaning that
l4Sartre points out that the phenomenalists erred in
failing to recognize this non-identity: "Having justifiably reduced the object to the connected series of its appearances, the
believed they had reduced its being to the succession of its
modes of being." (~, lx)
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"transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness."l;
In other words, the structure of consciousness is such that it
reaches out beyond itself.

As intentional, consciousness has no

being other than to be a revealing and hence requires something
revealed.

Built into the very structure of consciousness, there-

fore, is the demand for the support of a being which is other
than consciousness.

This being, which supports consciousness in

its being, is but the transphenomenal being of phenomena, the
In-itself. 16
The Sartrean "ontological proof" thus reveals the independence of the being of phenomena, of the In-itself, by claiming that the being ot consciousness is a consciousness of something which it !! B2i and thereby is dependent upon something
which it is

~,

namely, the In-itself.

Sartre's employment of

the phenomenological method and his wielding of the fundamental
intentionality of consciousness have hence yielded three ontological discoveries eXpressed in the "ontological proof":

(1)

the In-itself is independent in its being; (2) the For-itself !!
~theln-itself; and

(3) the Por-itself is a relation to the

In-itself in virtue of its dependence upon the latter.

These

ontological conclusions, afforded Sartre by phenomenology, point,

15m,

!xi.
l60f • Robert E.

Butts, "Does 'Intentionality' Imply
'Being'? A Paralogism in Sartre's Ontology," Journal of Philosophy. LV (1958), 911-12, for a critique of Sartre's-ontolog1ca~ argument.
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however, to a dual paradox which grips the Sartrean ontology.
First, the two regions of transphenomenal being, viewed as radically distinct, are nevertheless declared bound in virtue of
the For-itself's intrinsic relation to the In-itself.

Secondly,

the For-itself's dependence upon the In-itself reveals the ontological priority of the In-itself in Sartre's system, but
within that system the For-itself--not the In-itself--bears the
ontological burden of bringing "potency"

and.

"essence" into the

world, of issuing, in general, the categories of being.

To gain

a clearer grasp of this twofold paradox which engulfs the
Sartrean ontology, however, we must consider what Sartre conceives as the characteristios of the In-itself and the Foritself.
THE IN-ITSELF

~ ~

FOR-ITSELF

Being-in-itself
The being of phenomena, or being-in-itself t is nothing
other than the being of this page, of this typewriter.

As in-

dicated by the infinite-finite dualism, the "primary characteristic ft of the In-itself is "never to reveal itself completely to
consciousness. ttl?

But what are its other characteristics?

The

In-itself, Sartre claims, is inherence in self without distance;
it is total, coincidence with itself
itself.

and.

hence cannot refer to

Because of such utter undividedness, the region of the
l?mi" !xii.
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In-itself is thus governed by the principle of non-contradiction
Its complete self-containment and identity preclude its requiri
connection with what it is not.

But, having no otherness, the

In-itself, moreover, escapes becoming.

Beyond becoming, it has

no past and no future and hence is also beyond temporality. It
simply is, is what it is, is in-itself. 18 Derived neither from
another existent nor from a possibility, since possibility is a
structure of consciousness and consciousness itself depends upon
the In-itself, the In-itself, Bartre concludes, is contingently,
escaping both necessity and possibility.
If one were to ask Sartre to describe the manner in
which such characteristics are disclosed, he might well proceed
in somewhat the following way.

Take the example of a rock.

infinite-finite duality reveals that
haust the being of this rock.

my

The

consciousness cannot ex-

Not only is this true of a simple

confrontation with this rock, but it is equally true of any scientific analysis that my consciousness makes upon this rock.
Though I may well discern the constituents of this rock and
their respective percentages of composition, the being of this
rock eludes my analysis.

The rock is so opaque, so self-con-

tained., that I cannot ttbreak in" and "get a grip on its being."
The rock is a rock with full positivity, complete identity.

I

l8Sartre states: "Being is. Being is in-itself. Being
is yhat it is. These are the three characteristics which the
preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to
assign to the being of phenomena." (BN, lxvi)

18

cannot say

o~

it:

"It isn't

otherness; it is--rock.

itsel~

today," because it has no

That it is situated on this patch

grass, moreover, makes no

dif~erence

o~

to the rock, as verified

by my moving it,

~or

this rock has no intrinsic connection to

what it is not.

Then, too, this rock does not reveal itself as

having a past or a future.

Nor is it meaningful to speak of the

rock as having a past or a future, for the rock is, and, as
utter coincidence with itself, escapes temporality which requires dimensional distance.

From a confrontation with an

object such as the rock, Sartre thus discerned an ontological
principle characterized by undividedness, identity, opacity,
fullness, permanence, independence and non-temporality--this is
the In-itself. 19
Being-for-itself
If one were to negate the characteristics of the Initself, one would have, in a limited way, a view of the Foritself.

Limited, for to consider these regions in strict iso-

lation would be to misconstrue reality as Sartre envisions it.
The concrete, the real, is the synthetic totality, man-in-theworld.

Hence, as the characteristics of the In-itself are

190nly a brief sketch of the In-itself 1s intended in
these introductory remarks. An amplification upon the characteristics cited will be made in a later context. Cf. M. Corvez,
"L'Etre-en-soi dans la philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre," Revue
Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 360-72, for an exceptionally good account
of the Sartrean In-itself.
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revealed because a consciousness is in relation to it, so, too,
the characteristics of man are revealed only if he is considered
in the world.

But what can be said of man-in-the-world, of the

For-itself?
Examining various attitudes and activities which man
assumes in and toward the world, Bartre claims the discovery of
a transphenomenality of non-being as actual as that of being-initself.

To illustrate this disclosure of non-being, he puts

forth an analysis of a concrete, negative judgment.

Having an

appointment with Pierre in a cafe, one goes there, looks around
and states:

"He is not here."

Is it absurd to speak of an in-

tuition of the non-being, of the absence of Pierre?

Or, is it

absurd to assert the truth of a negative judgment that is unfounded in reality?

Employing the Gestalt premise that per-

ception always implies the construction of a figure on a ground,
Bartre maintains that when one enters the cafe his attention is
directed toward the appearance of Pierre.

So directed, one

negates the elements of the cafe which appear as not being
Pierre and thus orientates them as the ground upon which Pierre
is given as about to appear.

But Pierre is not here and yet the

whole cafe remains the ground upon which the absence of Pierre
looms before him, given intuitively.

Granted that one's ex-

pectation has caused the absence of Pierre to happen, Pierre's
absence is nonetheless a real event; the non-being of Pierre
haunts the cafe in all its plenitude.

There is, then, a real

20
relation between this non-being and the being of the cafe, in
contrast to the relation of thought between Napoleon's absence
and the cafe.

Thus Sartre concludes:

"Non-being does not come

to things by a negative judgment; it is the negative judgment,
on the contrary, which is conditioned and supported by nonbeing.,,20 There is, therefore, a transphenomenality of nol'lbeing.

But what is the relation between being and that non-

being which haunts it?

What, moreover, is the origin of noth-

ingness?
Regarding the relation between being and non-being, the
Sartrean example has

illustr~ted

that Pierre's absence appears

only on the ground. of the cafe's plen!tude of being and hence
that non-being "exists only on the surface of being, «21 subsequent to being.

Sartre claims, however, that non-being must

not be considered as a peripheral threat surrounding being.22
/

/

If the negatites that occur within the world--absence, destruction,

distance-~are

to be founded, then non-being must

20BN , 11. Sartre also considers the human activities
of interrogation and destruction as revealing a transphenomenality of non-baing. But the import of the co~sideration of
negative judgment is the repudiation of the view that non-being
is solely a structure of negative judgment. Cf. 1[, 6-12.
21BN , 16. Cf. BN, 12-16 for Sartre's negative dialectic
with the Hegelian view O? the relation between being and nonbeing.
22Sartre is here rejecting Heideggerts view of the
relation between being and non-being. For his critique of the
Heideggerian view, cf. ![. 16-21.
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appear at the heart of being, must be grounded in a negative
being which itself appears at the heart of the world.
What is this negative being which issues nothingness?
That the In-itself is in principle excluded from being the sourc
of nothingness is evinced, according to Sartre, by its very
positivity, plenitude and identity.

Since the only other region

of transphenomenality is that of the For-itself, since patterns
of conduct including interrogation. destruction and negative
judgment reveal forms of non-being, human reality must be the
source of nothingness.

To emit nothingness, human reality,

moreover, must be nothingness.

As Sartre asserts:

"The being

by which Nothingness comes into the world must be its own
Nothingness.,,23

That consciousness is nothingness, furthermore,

fulfills Sartre's demand that non-being be subsequent to being;
for, as attested by the "ontological proof," consciousness requires in its being the support of the In-itself inasmuch as it
constitutes itself as not In-itself.

Consciousness, then, ex-

isting only as a dynamic naughting of the In-itself, is the
/

I

nothingness which issues the negatites which appear at the heart
of the world.
The preceding Sartrean argumentation claiming nothingness as the structure of the For-itself represents Sartre's initial pronouncement in favor of the view that the For-itself is

23~, 23.
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non-substantial,24 that is, that consciousness lacks identity
with itself; that consciousness is not opaque, self-contained,
fully determinate; that consciousness is not determined by something which it is; that consciousness is not a static unity, a
mere support.

The Sartrean claim of insubstantiality for the

For-itself is thus a claim that human reality cannot
fixed and final manner.

~

in a

As insubstantial, as nothingness, human

reality is rather the possibility of self-detachment, of perpetual withdrawal in relation to itself--a possibility which,
moreover, conditions every rupture with the world, every nihilat ion ot the contingent In-itself.

In other words, as insubstantial, as nothingness, consciousness ~ freedom. 25 Continu-

ally on the road of self-construction, consciousness must continually choose.

As a freedom engaged in the task of selt-

construction, consciousness is at one stroke the putting ot its
past (an instance of its necessary connection with the In-itselt
of its facticity) out of play and the choice of an end which is
,

not-yet, an end which is in the future.

Consciousness as free-

dom is thus the selt-temporalizing present which finds its
24C£. Norman N. Greene, Jean-Paul Sartre: The Existentialist Ethic (University of Michigan: Inn Arbor-raperbacks,
1963), 16-18 for a lucid account of the non-substantiality of
consciousness.
25Ct • M. Cranston, Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Grove
Press, 1962), 44-49, for a discussion of the Sartrean usage of
the term "nothingness" and its relation to the principle of
freedom.
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future an open horizon of possibilities and which transcends

~

nihilation what it has been, what it has made itself, that is,
its essence.

Freedom, as consciousness, as nothingness, hence

reveals that human reality is never simply what it is, that
human reality is always at a distance from itself.
Inasmuch as consciousness is a negative being of internal distance, is the nihilation of the In-itself, consciousness lacks the permanence, fullness, coincidence with itself, in
a word, the substantiality which characterizes the In-itself.
As lack, consciousness is desire--desire of the substantiality
of the In-itself while retaining the translucidity of consciousness.

Consciousness attempts to recover the substantiality

which it perpetually nihilates by relating itself to the Initself through knowledge and action.
attempt is doomed to failure.

But, Sartre avers, the

For, to become In-itself, con-

sciousness would lose itself as consciousness.

Hence, Qon-

sciousness, as the nihilation of the In-itself and as the project toward the value In-itself-For-itsel! or God, is an internal
negation in suspension, neither In-itself nor In-itself-Foritself.

"The nature ot consciousness simultaneously is to be

what it is not and not to be what it is."26

Consciousness ~

the In-itsel!, in the mode of not-being it, and

~

its possible,

the In-itself-For-itself, in the mode of not-being it.

As in-

ternal negation, consciousness thus exists after the manner of
26![, 70.
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a relation.

As Sartre asserts:

liThe For-itself is relation,,,27

the original relation between the realms of In-itself and Foritself. 28
Dynamism, possibility, freedom, temporality, facticity,
non-coincidence with self, lack, desire, value, internal negation, non-substantiality, relation--such are the characteristics
of the Sartrean For-itself as viewed in a preliminary fashion. 29
But there is one further point to be indicated at this time.
Recalling Spinoza's dictum:

"All determination is negation,"

Sartre claims that determination springs from negation.

Con-

sciousness, as internal negation, thus bears the burden of issuing all the determinations in the world, of issuing the traditional categories of being as such.

The reason for the para-

doxical disproportion between the ontological priority of the
In-itself and the ontological task of the For-itself within the
Sartrean system, a disproportion previouslJ cited,30 hence rests
with the structure of the For-itself as internal negation and
2 7!!!, 362.
28J!!, 617.
29Two good articles dealing with the Sartrean For-itself
are: M. Corvez, "L'Etre de la conscience dans la philosopbie de
J.-P. Sartre," Revue Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 562-74; and J.
Graaten, ttLe soi chez Klerkegaard et Sartre," Revue Phllosophiq'U,E
!!!. Louvain. L (1952), 64-89.
30Cf • above, 15-17.
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Sartre's acceptance of the principle that determination springs
from negation.

But, while Sartre's grounds for assigning con-

sciousness the task of issuing all determination have been discerned, a problem, nevertheless, emerges.
STATEMENT Q! THE PROBLEM
Within the Sartrean framework, consciousness thus looms
before us as a dynamic negation which originates the determinations of being as such.

Multiple dimensions of this functioning

of consciousness have been manifested in this introductory consideration of Sartre's ontology:

first, that the finitude of

the appearance of an object is surpassed to infin! ty occurs because there is a consciousness capable of taking diverse points
of view on an object; second, that certain "potencies" return
to inhabit the In-itself, as the "potency" to exhibit an infinite number of manifestations, occurs because there is a consciousness relating itself to the In-itself; and finally, that
essence, the meaning of an object, re-·enters the region of the
In-itself occurs because of human intentional activity.

Yet,

these are but a few of the determinations of being as such
issue from consciousness.

whi~~

Sartre further deems consciousness

responsible for the upsurge of such traditional categories of
being as place, quantity, quality, potentiality, temporality
and relation itself.
question to Sartre is:

In view of this striking affirmation, our
tI~

consciousness, the For-itself,

26
bear the burden of_ originating the catesories 2!. beiAS, qua
being?"

This question arises in terms of the radical distinc-

tion between the For-i t;3elf and the In-i taelf, a distinction
indicated by the diverse characteristics of these regions and
culminated by the assertions that the For-itself is relat10n,3l
while the In-itsel_f is substance; 32 that the For-itself 1s
Nothingness; the In-itself, Being.

How can the For-itself, then

so ontologically dissimilar from the In-itself, issue categories
of being which bridge both ontological realms and are applicable
to each?
That this type of question is posed justifiably is
recognized by Bartre himself in the concluding remarks of Being

~Nothingness.33

Considering the question of whether the

regions of For-itself and In-itself can be classified under a
general heading termed "Being," Sartre points out that such a
question is not ontological, but rather is metaphysical.

To

those who wish to concern themselves with such issues, Bartre
suggests, however, that the notions of immanence and transcendence should both be taken into consideration.
Following Bartre's suggestion in discerning

whcthe~ th~

For-itself as relation can bear the burden of originating the
categories of being, we shall consider the meaning of the
310f • ~, 1?1-?2, 362; 492-93; 575-?6; 624.
32Cf • ~, 1?1-?2; 459; 506.
330f • ![, 621-25.
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For-itself qua relation from the dual aspect of immanence and
transcendence.

But we shall raise the further question of

whether this relation, the For-itself, is substantialized.
though Sartre

r~peatedly

Al-

denies that the For-itself is sub-

stantial with such remarks as:

"Our description of the for-

itself has shown us how this, on the contrary. is removed as
far as possible from a substance • • • 4 the justification for

:3

our questioning such assertions will be made evident by an examination of the characteristics of the For-itself and of the
way in which Sartre handles the For-itself in drawing out the
categories of being.

This question of the substantialization

of the For-itself, moreover, bears upon our

metapr~sical

con-

cern inasmuch as a substantialization of the For-itself would
indicate a common ground between the two regions of being. which
in turn, would give more plausibility to

t~e

Saptrean attempt to

introduce the categories of being through the For-itself.

Our

approach. then, is to elucidate the meaning of the For-itself
as relation and to examine the question of whether the Foritself is substantialized, with the hope that the insights
gleaned from these investigations will give us the answer to

34BN , 171.
551; 618. --

Cf. also _BN, 84; 174; 431; 453; 459; 462;
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our ~etaphysical issue. 35

35As we approach a detailed examination of the Sartrean
ontology, it would be well to note those studies which present
an extensive, critical summary of Beigg and Nothin~ess: H. J.
Blackham, ItJean-Paul Sartre,lI Six EXlsteiitTalis~ ThIllkers (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959),110-481
besan, The Tragic
Finale (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1~60); F. Jeanson, Le
Probleme morale et la pensee de Sartre (Paris: Editions au
Hyrte,-,c941); R.~oIrvet, Les-rroctrines existentialistes de
Kierkegaard a J-P. Sartre rADbaye Salnt-Wannrille, 1948),-r44230; M. Nataiison, A Critl.9,ue of Jean-Paul Sartre' s Ontology
(Lincoln: University 0:C Nebraska Press, 1951); J. Sa1vall~To
Be and Not To Be (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 19b2);
r. Troisfontalnes, Le Choix de Jean-Paul
Sartre: E~ose et
critique de 'LtEtre-et Ie neant i (2na ea.; Paris: lUbler-et Cie,
1946); G. ""Varet, L 'OntolOgie ne Sartre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948);Jr. Verneaux, "L'Ontologie phenomenologique de J.-P. Sartre," Lecons sur l'existentialism et ses
formes principales, Troisieme PartIe~arIs: P. TeqtiI, 1948;;111-37.
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PART TWO

THE HEANING OF THE FOR-ITSELF AS RELATION

CHAPTER I

THE SELF-RELATEDNESS OF THE FOR-ITSELF
One frequently hears himself or others remark:

"If only

I could be myself," "I'm struggling with myself," or "I'm not
myself today."

Are such statements expressive of an ontologi-

cal structure lived by man or are they without ontological significance? Opting for the former, Sartre claims that such remarks indicate that the For-itself always exists at a distance
from itself in a relation of identity denied--an ontological
structure that pervades human reality in multiple dimensions of
engagement with itself.

This Sartrean claim, however, reaffirms

a radical distinction between the two regions of being, between
the relational For-itself and the non-relational In-itself,l
and thus seems to jeopardize the Sartrean view concerning the
For-itself as the source of the categories of being as such.

In

order to decide, however, whether the For-itself, an insubstantial relation, can bear the brunt of issuing categories applicable to a region of non-relational substance, the Sartrean
lThough the non-relationality of the In-itself was expressed in our introductory remarks, this view is reaffirmed by
Sartre's statement: "The principle of identity is the negation
of every species of relation at the heart of being-in-itself."

-

(BN,

77).
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meaning of the For-itself qua relation must be explored from
the dual stance of its self-relatedness, the concern of this
chapter, and its relation to the world, the topic to be dealt
with in the succeeding chapter.

What, then, are the multiple

dimensions of the For-itself's engagement with itself?
Presence to self
Sartre states:

"The law of being of the for-itself, as

the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself in
the form of presence to self.,,2

But what does Sartre mean by

"presence to self'," the f'undamental intra-structure of the Foritself?

To illustrate, consider a man who is struggling with

himself.

That a struggle grips his entire being indicates a

duality within the unity of' his consciousness, points to a relation whereby he stands at a distance from the self which he
wants to be in the mode of utter self-coincidence.

His struggle

to gain total identity with this self which he wants to

~,

his

desire to come to himself only serve to re-emphasize the distance at which he stands from himself within the unity of his
being.

The self which he wants to be, though indicative of him-

self as subject, thus represents only his way of not beias his
own coincidence.

Presence to self, then, implies a detachment

in the subject related to himself--a fissure or a disintegration
of coincidence within human reality--and thus defines the subject

~

subject, as other than In-itself.

2

,.,,.;

BN_t ((.
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But what separates the subject from himself in the case
of presence to self?

Nothing, answers Bartre.

some thiAS as effecting

tr~s

For to consider

separation would be to introduce

into the subject an opacity which would shatter the unity and
translucency of consciousness.

In order to be subject, rather

than a substantial In-itself, consciousness must then include
within the unity of its being its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity, of the absolute cohesiveness of the Initself. 3
Reoted in the notion of presence to selt and further
indicative of the radical contrast between the For-itself and
the In-itself is, moreover, what Bartre terms "bad faith, II a
lie to oneself, a lie within the unity of a single consciousness.

A typical example of bad faith, according to Bartre, is

-

the attitude of a waiter who seeks to be a waiter as this table
is a table.

He assumes the role of a mechanical waiter, of an

entity with a fixed and determined nature, and thereby runs
from the reality of the free, unpredictable For-itself.
plays at being a waiter.

But, by the mere fac't that he is

playing a role, he places himself beyond that role.
reveals that he

~

He

He thus

a waiter in the only mode possible for human

reality--in the mode of

~

being one.

Human reality, in other

words, defies consideration as being absolutely what it is. Or,
as Bartre states, human reality flis a being which is what it is

3Cf. BN, 77-78.

-
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not and which is not what it is, ,,4 a being which is governed by
neither the principle of

identi~

nor the principle of non-

contradiction, but rather by the law of presence to self, the
perpetual disengagement of the self from itself.
Considering the man in bad faith from another point of
view, Bartre formulates the phenomenon of presence to selt in
terms of a dyad:

the reflecting-reflection dyad.

The man in

bad faith believes that he is a waiter in the same way a tree
is a tree.

He, moreover, has an immediate or non-thetic aware-

ness of this belief.

Yet, while belief and consciousness (of)

belief are immanent wi thin the un! ty of this man t s being, while
these terms are mutually referent and dependent, belief and
consciousness (of) belief are distinct.
Nothing, but that consciousness.

What separates them?

For, Bartre maintains, the

very structure of consciousness is to exist as a translucent
As such, consciousness exists
in the form of a reflecting-reflection dyad. In selfconsciousness of what it is not.

consciousness, moreover, the terms of this dyad are so incapable
of presenting themselves separately that the duality remains
perpetually evanescent and each term, while positing itself for
the other, becomes the other.

If one attempts to grasp the

reflection, in this case belief, the fissure reappears; if one
attempts to grasp the reflecting, one finds only the reflection,
belief.

The reflecting, then,

~

the reflection, but as
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presence to the reflection, as witness of the reflection, the
reflecting constitutes itself as other than the reflection. 5
Presence to self, in its various manifestations, hence
expresses the disengagement of consciousness from itself.

Con-

tinually constituting itself as B£i that of which it is consciousness, consciousness--in the form of presence to self-perpetually falls short of achieving the absolute coincidence,
the cohesive identity, attributed by Sartre to the In-itself.
But such is the being of the For-itself.

As Sartre states:

"It

is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in
the form of an elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a
being which perpetually effects in itself a break in being. n6
That the For-itself exists only "in the form of an elsewhere in
relation to itself''' is thus the f'undamental meaning of presence
to self.

It is, moreover., indicative of a

s~thesis

of the sub-

ject and the self to which he stands, of' the reflecting and the
reflection--a synthesis which, however, must be negative in that
the subject stands to himself as not

bei~

the self which he

!!

at an ideal distance from himself, in that the reflecting constitutes itself as E2! the reflection which

it~.

As such a

nihilating synthesis, the For-itself, in the form of presence
to self, is hence a relation of denied

5!¥!., 74-78.
6BN 78.
-'

identi~.
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The For-itself--Value Dyad
Presence to self, Bartre claims, reveals that consciousness, as a relation of denied identity, lacks coincidence with
itself--or, is a lack of self.

The existence of desire, more-

over, attests that human reality is lack.

As lack, as desire,?

the For-itself thus seeks completion, surpasses itself toward
•

But, toward what?
Founding itself as consciousness by denying in relation

to itself a certain mode of being, that of being-in-itself,
human reality lacks the self from which it effects a perpetual
nihilating withdrawal--the self as being-in-itself.

This miss-

ing mode of In-itself, however, cannot be construed as a concrete, contingent In-itself.

For, if consciousness were to

coincide with such an In-itself, it would cease being consciousness and would become a "thing."

The In-itself which the For-

itself lacks, then, must be an absent In-itself, devoid of
contingency, an In-itself which the For-itself can be while retaining its consciousness.

Bartre thus asserts that the ideal

being toward which human reality projects itself is a being
which "would be its own foundation not as nothingness but as
being and would preserve within it the necessary translucency
of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of
?For Bartre, desire is consciousness, is a lack of
beins-in-itself. Cf.![, 8?~8.
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being-in-itself. n8

In other words, that toward which the For-

itself surpasses itself is the impossible synthesis:

the In-

itself-For-itself.
Claiming that man's hypostatization of this synthesis
as a transcendence beyond human reality, as God, is a betrayal
of its wholly immanent character, Sartre avers that this totality has no priority over consciousness since the ideality of
its being is dependent upon consciousness.

But, neither does

consciousness have priority over this ideal synthesis.

For,

Sartre points out, consciousness derives its very meaning as
lack from the In-itself-For-itself.

Interdependent and yet

distinct, the In-itself-For-itself and the For-itself thus form
a dyad at the heart of human reality.
Because the In-itself-For-itself is non-thetically apprehended as desirable, its being, moreover, is to be value.
As Sartre states:
Value is the self insofar as the self haunts the heart
of the for-itself as that for which the for-itself is.
The supreme value toward which consciousness at every
8RN , 90. Inasmuch as consciousness depends in its
being upon the In-itself which it reflects, consciousness must
assume the contingency of the In-itself. Consciousness must
exist on the surface of being-in-itself. "Eve~hi~ takes
place as if the in-itself in a project to foun
ts~f gave itsel? tEe modification of the for-itself." (![. 621) This Initself, nihilated in the For-itself, remains at the heart of
the For-itself as its original contingency. The For-itself's
necessary connection with the In-itself is termed its facticity.
It is in an effort to escape its facticity, its contingency,
that human reality seeks to become a being which would be its
own reason for being, that is, a necessary being, the In-itselfFor-itself.
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instant surpasses itself by ita very being is the
absolute being of the self with its characteristics
of identity, of purity, of permanence, etc., and as
its own foundation. 9
"Value is the self."

Value is as the meaning of the For-itself;

value is as an absent In-itself; value!! as given with the nonthetic translucency of the For-itself.
unrealizable, !!

B2i.

Yet, value, as forever

The For-itself. in seeking the sub-

stantiality of the In-itself while retaining the translucidity
of consciousness. thus relates to value as the ideal self which
it !!--but in the mode of non-being, in a mode which is not that
of being-in-itself.
Inseparable and yet distinct, the For-itself and value
hence form a dyad within the unity of human reality.

Value,

then, upsurges with the For-itself and only because there is a
For-itself. 10 But, while sustaining the ideal being of value,
the For-itself is denied an actual attainment of the impossible
synthesis:

In-itself-For-itself.

Though absent, value never-

theless qualifies the For-itself, makes an intrinsic difference
9BN, 93 •
.......

lOThat value arises with the For-itself and only because
there is a For-itself represents the Sartrean thesis that the
For-itself is the source of all determination. of all the categories of being. Though we are here concerned with the meaning
of the For-itself as relation, such Sartrean manipulation of
the For-itself should be noted.
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to the being of the For-itself.

For, it is via value that the

For-itself non-thetically grasps itself as lack and hence engages in the process of self-construction, a process terminated
by death but never completed inasmuch as value is never realized.

The self-relation which is human reality in the form of

the For-itself-value dyad is thus one of internal negation:
value is :f.mmanent within human reality as an ideal being, but
the For-itself is denied beipg value in the mode of an Inltsel.f. ll
~

Possible

~ ~

Circuit

2f.. Selfness

Sartre capitalizes on the For-itself as lack in still
another way to mani.fest the self-relatedness of the For-itself.
Each particular For-itself lacks a specific concrete reality
which would constitute this For-itself as itself.

Again, we

ask, what is the nature of that which consciousness lacks?

- -----

As

-the For-

a quarter moon lacks three-quarters of the moon which it is in
order to be a full moon, so, too, Sartre maintains,

itself lacks precisely the For-itself which it is in order to
complete itself.

In view of the ideal of coincidence with self,

the For-itself which I lack, then, must be the For-itself which
I am, not a strange For-itself.

Nevertheless, I cannot be the

llThough we have considered the For-itself-value dyad
in an abstract fashion, Sartre avers that value is not merely a
pure abstraction. Concrete consciousness always emerges with
a situation. Cf. BN, 90-92.

-
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For-itself which I lack in the mode of identity, otherwise I
would lapse into In-itself.

I, then, am the For-itself which

I am not, which I lack, in the mode of having

~

be this For-

itself in order to attempt identification with it in the unity
of the self.

This particular For-itself which I am and yet

lack constitutes a possible for me, a possible which accompanies my upsurge into being as the nihilation of the In-itself, a
way of being what I am--at a distance from se1f. 12
Let us consider an example to elucidate the meaning of
possibility.

Even in writing this sentence here and now, there

is consciousness (of) writing this work.

The consciousness (of)

writing this work refers me, not only to the pages written,
but also to the pages unwritten.

With the consciousness (of)

writing this work emerges the consciousness (of) the completed
product, my possibility.

......

I am this consciousness (of) the com-

pleted work, not as a tree is a tree, but rather as B2iyet or
at

~

distance from self.

That distance £rom self qualifies

possibility is indicative, moreover, of Bartra's position that
onll consciousness has the structure of possibility and hence
that only consciousness can issue posslbillties.l 3
l2.......
BN , 95ff •
l3The In-itself, as fullness, cannot have possibility
as its immediate structure. The possibilities attributed to
the In-itself have consciousness as their source. Again, the
Sartrean For-itself is called upon to issue a category of being
as such.

il·11
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One may question, however, whether the For-itself does

I

·.il':I.'
1

,.'

'r

1.'li

,',

not achieve coincidence with the lacking For-itself when the
latter is realized.

Consider again the example.

The conscious-

ness (of) the completed work as realized is itself a For-itself.
Emerging with this realized consciousness, then, is another
horizon of possibilities--the possibility of a sequel, the possibility of publication.

The realized consciousness thus up-

surges with a possible which it !! as

E21 yet

and hence lacks.

Consoiousness, then, always falls short of realizing the ultimate value whioh it intends by realizing its possibles.

But

what separates the For-itself from the For-itself lacked?
The separation, in one sense, is effected by a nothingness which slips in between the For-itself and its possible.
For, non-thetically conscious of the possible. the For-itself
constitutes itself as

E21

the possible whioh it is.

Yet, in

another sense, the separation is eftected by the totality of
existents in the world, for the possible arises as a presence
to a particular state of affairs.

To revert to our example,

the possibility ot publication arises as presence to the concrete situation concerning the market tor such a work, the
publisher's opinion and so on.

In the etfort to seek coinci-

dence.with this possible, one must thus traverse the existents
in the world.
Sartre terms this relation of the For-itself with its
possible the "circuit ot selfness."

What, however, does he

fl
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mean by the term "selfness"?
Selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried
further than the pure presence to itself of the prereflective cogito--in the sense that the possible
which I am is not pure presence to the for-itself
as reflection to reflecting, but that it is absent~resence. Due to this fact the existence of reference as a structure of bting in the for-itself is
still more clearly marked. 14
Wielding again the nihilating activity of consciousness, Sartre
composes contrapuntally another variation on the theme of selfrelatedness.

Having heard the variations of the For-itself's

relation with pure presence (reflection) and with pure absence
(value), we are introduced to the For-itself's relation with
absent-presence (possibility).

But, precisely, what is the

structure of the relation of the For-itself with its possible,
the lacking For-itself?
The For-itself which I am as presence to self and the
For-itself which I am but lack as an absent-presence to self
are the terms ot this relation considered abstractly.15
the terms themselves have the status of relation.

But

For the

l4BN , 103. Sartre repudiates any attempt to identify
selfness WIth the Ego which is of the nature of In-itself within
the Sart~aan perspective. Ct. 1[, 102-103.
l5The delineation of specific relations of the Foritself is an abstract consideration in that the For-itself cannot be considered as an independent term entering into a relation, save through abstraction. But the For-itself exists its
ontological dimensions simultaneously. More will be said about
this later.
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For-itself which I am as presence to self is relation and the
For-itself which I am yet lack is relation as an absent-presence
to self.

The relation of the For-itself with its possible is

thus a relation relating
identity

~

relations which

~

denied

~

2! being-in-itself. This marked play on relation hence

serves Bartre's purpose to evince the referential structure of
the For-itself and its radical distinction from the In-itself,
but does it serve his employment of the For-itself as the source
of categories of being?
That a tension is developing within the Bartrean uystem
concerning the preceding question is evinced, moreover, in that
Bartre's handling of the For-itself's relation to its possible
reveals transcendence at the heart of jmmanence.

Not only is

there within the For-itself a going out toward value and possibilities, but there is also a projection toward objects in the
world, objects which must be traversed in order to realize any
given possible.

In virtue of its transcendence, then, the For-

itself refuses the self-containment, the substantial limits of
the In-itself and, Bartre avers, the instantaneous Cartesian
cogito.

Bound to the meaning of the For-itself's transcendence

and its refusal of such substantiality is thus the Sartrean

notion of the For-itself's temporality.16
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TemporaliY:
Viewing temporality as a dynamic synthesis of past,
present and future, Sartre seeks to show that temporality is
the being of the For-itself. 17 Approaching an examination of
time by considering the type of relation obtaining between the
past and the present, Bartre points to the irreversibility of
the temporal dimensions as evidence of an internal relation.
That the past and present, together with the future, involve
such a relation, moreover, excludes the non-relational Initself trom temporal dimensionality.

For relationality demands

a distance excluded from the region of the absolutely cohesive
In-itselt. 18 As Bartre says regarding the past, there can be
a "past only tor a present which cannot exist without being its
past--back there, behind itselt. n19 In other words, there can
be a past only tor the For-itselt, since only the For-itself is
at a distance trom selt. 20
l7For Bartre's opposition to treating time as a series
of externally related "nows," cf. BN, 107-13; 130-36. Sartre's
intention to evince that temporalitY is the being of the Foritselt is ultimately an intention to show that temporality
comes to the world through the For-itselt, that the For-itself
is the source ot -the time ot the world.
18A certain temporality will come to rest upon the
region at the In-itselt, but only through the intentional activity of the For-itself. This point will be considered in
Chapter II ot Part III.
19!!!" 114.

20As will be discussed, Sartre considers the present as
the being of the For-itself.
",
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Though distance qualifies the For-itself's relation to
its past, the For-itself, Bartre maintains, must nevertheless be
its past.

Or, there would be no ontological foundation for such

phenomena as bearing responsibility for past actions, as sustaining in some way the being which I !!!!., that is, my essence,
the consummated possibles which define me.

But, while I must

be my past, my past is behind me, is fixed, congealed or, as
Bartre states, my "past is substance,"2l is In-itself.

I must

then be my past, but not in the mode of identity of being-initself or I would lapse into In-itself.

In other words, though

the "relation of being which I have to sustain with the past is
a relation of the type of the in-itself--that is, an identification with itself,"22 I nevertheless am not my past, for I !!!!.
it.

As Bartre expresses this paradoxical situation:
If already I am. no longer what I was, it is still
necessary that I have to be so in the unity of a
nihilating synthesis which I myself sustain in
being, otherwise I would have no relation of any
sort with what I am no longer, and my full positivity would be exclusive of the non-being essential
to becom1ng.2~

In virtue of its very structure, then, the For-itself is always
beyond its past.

But the very nihilating activity in terms of

which the For-itself surpasses its past also binds the

21BN 119.
-'
22BN 116.

-'
-'

2~BN

117.
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For-itself to its past in a relation 2! identity denied.

That

this is a case of identity is evinced by the fact that the past
is the For-itself become In-itself;24 that this identity is
denied the type of identity of the In-itself is secured by the
nihilating activity which is the For-itself.
Unlike the past, the present is For-itself.

On the

basis of the "ontological proof," the fundamental meaning of the
present for Bartre is grounded in the notion of presence:
presence of the For-itself to being-in-itself.

the

Concerning

presence, Bartre asserts:

"Presence to __ indicates existence
outside oneself near to __,"2 5 involves an internal relation

between the being which is present (the For-itself) and the
being to which it is present (the In-itself).

In terms of in-

tentionality, the For-itself's presence, moreover, involves the
For-itself non-thetically witnessing itself in the presence of
a being as !!2.! being that being.

In other words, presence to

__ expresses the For-itself's internal relation with being-initself as the nih11ation of the In-itself.
presence to __, as For-itself. then.

!!E2i.

The present, as
As Bartre states:

"It makes itself present in the form of a flight. • ••

It is

24The past is indicative of the For-itself's facticity,
that is, of its necessar,y connection with the In-itself. In
terms of facticity, a type of identity, other than the identity
of being-in-itself, can be predicated of the Bartrean cosito.
But this will be considered in Chapter I ot Part III.

2~, 121.
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a flight outside of co-present being and from the being which it
was toward the being which it will be."26

The present thus

refers not only to the past, but also to the future.
As revealed in the relation ot the For-itself with its
possible, the For-itself is a being which transcends itself
toward __, a being which comes to itself in terms of the

tu~ure,

a present which is a flight toward the For-itself which it
lacks, toward its possible.

The future is then a

mo~e

of the

For-itself's being, a mode which non-thetically brings meaning
to the present.

The future stands to the present as that com-

plement ot the For-itself which would secure self-coincidence,
but a complement which remains at a distance from self.

The

future, in other words, is that which the For-itself

but

~let.

~t

The For-itselt·s project toward the future which it

is, project toward self-coincidence, however, can never succeed,
since the future slips into the past and a new !uture--a new
possible--arises on the horizon as pI"eSenCe to co-future being.2
But what can be said of the For-itself _.;;;;..;;;.;;;;;.;;.;0.=
as relation
......... in the context of temporality?

An intra-structure of the For-itself, temporality "is
the being of the For-itself insofar as the For-itself has to be
its being ekstatically.,,28 The For-itself is a nihilating
26g, 123.
27Of. .m!, 124-29.
281!!., 136.
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transcendence suspended between modes of its being, but suspended dynamically so as to issue the synthesis of the temporal
dimensions which it holds in separation. 29

The For-itself,

hence, is what it is not (its past) and is not what it is (its
tuture).

As present, it enters into the terms of past and

future, sustaining their being and yet constituting itself as
present by retusing the mode of identity of being-in-itself wit
its terms.

Neither the terms of past and future nor the For-

itself as present, then, can exist in isolation from one another.

The relation which is For-itself is thus decidedly an

internal relation in that the For-itself as present determines
itself in terms of its flight from the past and projection
toward the future.

Such internality, however, ought not to be

construed as an importation of past and future into the Poritself as present.

For the For-itself as relation, in the con-

text of temporality, is:

t~efore

itself. n30 An internal relation

itself, behind itself: never

2! identity denied, the

29Temporality, while an intra-structure of the Foritself, is also the source of the meaning of "horizontal"
transcendence, of the For-itselt's relation with being-initself. The present as For-itself is bound not only to its past
(which the For-itself sustains even though the past has the
character of In-itself), but also to the co-present region of
the In-itself. Such "horizontal" transcendence is further manifested to a limited extent in the present's relation with the
future, since the future is a presence to a co-future region of
In-itself. But an explicit consideration of the For-itself's
horizontal transcendence is the concern of the following chapter
30~, 141.
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For-itself--as temporality--once more reveals that its being is
a refusal of the self-identity
stantiality

2!~

~~

In-itself, of the sub-

In-itself.

Reflection
In considering the thetic consciousness of enduring and
its relation to non-thetic temporality, Sartre discusses the
nature and the laws of reflection--a discussion which concerns
us primarily since it reveals another self-relation of the Foritself.

"Reflection," Sartre states, "is the For-itself con-

scious of itself.,,3l

The reflective consciousness and the con-

sciousness reflected-on, however, cannot be fundamentally related in terms of a thinking subject perceiving an object.

For

to grant such independence in being to consciousness would be
to eradicate the type of internal relation requisite for knowledge and to lapse into the Cartesian substantialist illusion.
Thus, "reflection must be united to that which is reflected-on
by a bond of being,"3 2 and yet the reflected-on must be distinct from the reflective as object and subject are distinct.
The familiar ontological structure of the Sartrean For-itself
again becomes apparent:

the reflective consciousness must both

be and not be the consciousness retlected-on.
3lmt, 150.
32BN 151.

-'
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Regarding reflection, Sartre maintains that, while the
reflective and the reflected-on tend toward independence (unlike the reflecting-reflection dyad), neither can achieve independence.

For, the reflective non-thetically witnesses its

own being only through the appearance of the reflected-on and
the reflected-on, altered by reflection, non-thetically witnesses itself as having an outside, as tending toward object,
only through its dependence upon the reflective. 33 Thus, the
operation of reflection reveals a totality of reflective and
reflected-on as a unitary structure of a being which issues a
nothingness forever separating these terms, while holding them
in unity.

In the case ot reflection, however, both terms are

in the form of the reflecting-reflection dyad, that is, in the
form of presence to self.

Hence, the separation between the

reflective and the reflected-on manifests that reflection is
a nihilation of the For-itself.

But, how can this be?

By means of reflection the For-itself attempts to "be
for itself what it is.,.34 According to Sartre, this involves a

33The ideal pole of the nihilation constituting reflection is an external negation, a scissiparity which would
render the reflected-on as In-itself. This scissiparity, however, is stifled by the fact that the reflected-on has to be
the reflective and vice versa. Only in the For-itself's relation to the Other is the sciSSiparity ettected--as will be
seen in the next chapter.

34u, 153.

-
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dual endeavor, an endeavor to achieve objectification and interiorization:

to be for itself an object-in-itself, an object

which is the subject as

it~.

But the project to grasp itself

in the mode of self-coincidence is doomed to failure, since the
reco'Very of the being which is lost requires a recovery in the
mode of its own being, that is, in the mode of the For-itself,
thus of flight.

As Sartre states, it is this failure which is

constitutive of reflection.
This turning back upon the selt is a wrenching away
from self in order to return to it. • •• For the
necessary structure of the for-itself requires that
its being can be recovered only by a being which itself exists in the form of for-itself. Thus the
being which effects the recovery must be constituted
in the mode of the for-itself, and the being which
is to be recovered must exist as tor-itself. And
these two beings must be the same beiIt. But exactly insofar as this being recovers
self, it
causes an absolute distance to exi~t between itself
~ itsel!--in the unity of being.'5
The project of the For-itself to achieve substantiality

~

reflection thus serves only to fling the For-itself back upon
itself as non-substantiality, as relation--as a refusal of the
self-coincidence of the Sartrean In-itself and the Cartesian
cosito.

In its relation with temporality, however, reflection
may be pure or impure.

In pure reflection, "the simple presence

of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself reflected-on.,,36

35mt• 154.
36mt• 155.
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the reflective has to be the reflected-on in complete immanence
and yet without being In-itself.

Because of such immanence,

moreover, reflection must be a peculiar type of knowledge.

For,

while knowledge involves making oneself other and thereby denying that one is the other, the unity of being of the reflective
and the reflected-on precludes such a total detachment of the

reflective from the reflected-on, as does the very motivation of
refleotion--to achieve the coincidence of the reflective Foritself and the For-itself reflected-on.

Hence, Sartre claims,

pure reflection is a lightning recognition rather than knowledge in the strict sense. 37
The lightning character of this recognition, however,
does not mean that the reflective and the reflected-on are instantaneous; each qua For-itself is in diasporatic fashion the
temporal dimensions.

In fact, it is in terms of the past and

the future that the reflected-on is distinguished from the reflective within the unity of being-far-itself.
makes any reflective statement:

For when one

I think, I doubt, one is al-

ready ahead of oneself in the future.

The reflective is always

presented as ahead of the retlected-on, thereby precluding the
attainment of the absolute self-coincidence or the In-itselt.
As Bartre asserts in maintaining that pure reflection is consoiousness of the three ekstatic dimensions:

37Cf. ![, 155-57.

"Pure reflection
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still discovers temporality only in its own original nonsubstantiality, in its refusal to be In-itself. u38 Pure reflection. then, while doing no violence to original temporality,
fails to achieve the project of the reflective consciousness,
the project from which the very meaning of reflection is
derived:

to be For-itself as the In-itself Is.
Impure reflection, though having pure reflection as its·

original structure, yields, however, only a succession of
psychic states.

Defined as "the apprehension of the reflacted-

on as in-itselt in a circuit of saltness in which reflection
stands in immediate relation with an in-itself which it has to
be."39 impure reflection, in contrast to the pure form, has
three terms:

the reflective, the reflected-on and an In-itself.

For, in seeking to grasp the reflected-on as In-itself, the reflective takes a point of view on it, posits itself as

~

being the reflected-on and thereby effects the appearance of an
In-itself as a shadowy being of the reflected-on.

By effecting

the appearance of an In-itself engulfing the reflected-on, impure reflection, however. does violence to the non-substantial
historicity of the reflected-on and thereby manifests itself as
bad faith.

For, while there is a declaration that the re-

flective 1s not the reflected-on, impure reflection still seeks
to make itself the object, the reflected-on as In-itself.

3~i. 158.
39BN:
160 •
.......
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Hence, Sartre states, "impure reflection is an abortive effort
on the part of the for-itself to

~

another while remainiB5

itself."40 To view oneself from the outside within the unity
of one's being, to grasp oneself as what one is in the mode of
coin.cidence, thus remains forever impossible.
Reflection, whether pure or impure, hence reveals the
failure of the For-itself's project to attain the substantiality of being-in-itself.

For the reflective, remaining always

ahead of the reflected-on, causes an absolute distance between
itself and the self-reflected-on and thus denies of itself the
mode of identity of being-in-itself. 41 The self-relation which
is reflection, then. manifests the For-itself as
internal negation,

~

relation

2!

2! identity denied.

SUlDJD!ll'Y

Having examined the various self-relations of the Foritself. are we now in a position to declare the significance of
Bartre's statement:

"The For-itself 1s relation"?

Are we now

in a position to pinpoint the meaning of the For-itself as a
"relation of internal negation." as a "relation of identity
denied"?

A capsule summary of our results seems indispensable
40g" 161.

4lBecause the reflective consciousness is always ahead
of the consciousness reflected-on, Bartre avers that the Cartesian cOfito might rather be formulated: "I think; therefore
I was." C • !N, 119.

-

to ascertaining our stance. 42
Presence to self reveals the For-itself as the synthesis
of the reflecting-reflection dyad, a dyad constitutive of the
being of the For-itself as the foundation of its nothingness,
as its original intra-structure.

That this relation is internal

is manifested by the fact that the For-itself
would vanish without the dyad.

qua

For-itself

That a dyad is held within the

unity of being-for-itself discloses, however, a distance within
the For-itself:

the ideal distance at which the reflection

stands from the reflecting.

In virtue of this distance, in

virtue of the distinction of its terms, the For-itself is thus
denied the identity of being-in-i tself •

As pr.3sence to self,

the For-itself is hence an internal relation of identity denied:
an internal relation as the synthesis of the reflectingreflection dyad constitutive of its being, identity denied as
the denial of the identity of the In-itself.

Inasmuch as the

reflecting constitutes itself as not the reflection which it is,
inasmuch as the subject stands to himself as not the self which
42In delineating the diverse self-relations of the Foritself, it is necessary to keep in mind that the consideration
is an abstract one, as noted previously (above 41, n. 15). In
the cohesive Sartrean ontology, no one ontological dimension of
the For-itself stands alone; the For-itself can exist only if
all its d;~nsions are sustained. But while the existent Foritself refuses consideration as an independent term of any of
its self-relations, to differentiate these relations and yet
find a cocmon threD.d of meani!Lg among them, it is necessary to
treat the For-itself under one aspect as a term of a relation
which is For-itself trom another point of view.
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he is at an ideal distance, the For-itself--as presence to
,self--however, is not a denial of identity per.!.2.:

the re-

flecting is not the reflection which it is in the sense that it
is not what it is in the mode of identity of being-in-itself.
Constructed upon the relation of presence to self--a
relation revealing the For-itself as lacking the substantiality
of the In-itself--is the For-itself--value dyad.

Upsurging with

the For-itself, as presence to self, as lack, is an absent Initself, the lacked.

Because the For-itself is qualified at the

heart of its being by the absent In-itself' and exists only in
relation to that elsewhere which it is denied by absence, the
relation which the For-itself is in the form

o~

the For-itself-

value dyad is decidedly an internal relation, a relation constituti've of the being of the For-itself.

That the For-itself

fails to achieve a synthesis with the absent In-itself, to
~

attain value, indicates, moreover, a distance between the terms
of this dyad.

Thus, again, the For-itself manifests itself as

•~ an internal relation of j.dentity denied. A refusal of the mode

I of identity of being-in-itself,

the For-itself, however, is not

to be construed as a refusal of identity

per~:

for, the For-

itself in the form of the For-itself-value dyad encloses value
within its being and hence

~

value, the ideal which qualifies

its every action, but not in the mode of' identity of the In:Ltsel.t.

A relation relating two relations, the For-itselfpossible

rel~~~

has as its terms the For-itself which I am

as presence to self and the For-itself which I
an absent-presence to self.

~

but lack as

In its effort to attain the self-

coincidence of the In-itself, the term For-itself requires
coincidence with a For-itself which it is, as absent: the Foritself which is its possible. 43 This absent For-itself qualifies the For-itself at the heart of its being inasmuch as the
For-itself, as presence to self, non-thetically grasps its
possible, thereby constitutes itself as not that possible which
it is and hence as a perpetual flight toward it.
itself perpetually determines

its~lf

That the For-

in relation to its possible

thus reveals that the For-itself-po£sible relation is an internal relatj.on.

That the For-itself can never achieve abso-

lute coincidence with its absent For-itself, however, reveals
that the For-itself again is denied the type of identity of
being-in-itself.

Nevertheless a type of identity pervades the

For-itself-possible structure, since the possible to which the
For-itself relates is !![ possible, since I call a certain
possible mine.

Thus, the For-itself, as an internal relation

43In that the effort of the For-itself to achieve coincidence with its absent For-itself is ultimately an effort to
gain substantiality, that 1s, the being of the In-itself which
is absent, the For-itself-value dyad is implied as a presupposition for ~he analysis ot the For-itself-poss1ble relation-a presupposition pointing to the cohes1ve character of Bartre's
ontology.
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of identity denied, is a refusal only of the identity of beingin-itself.
Te!porality, too, is viewed by Sartre as a relation of
identity denied.

The dimensions of temporality pose a problem,

however, in that the past is In-itself and the future "is not
~

itself and neither is it in the mode of being of the For-

itself, since it is the meanipg of the For-itself.,,44 Consequently, the past and the future are forever separated from the
For-itself as present.

Yet, the For-itself as present, as

flight, requires at the heart of its being the past from which
it flees and the future toward which it projects.
doxical being of the For-itself again emerges.

The para-

An internal

relation denying of itself the mode of identity of the Initself, the For-itself, as temporality, has to be its being
ekstatically, while maintaining some type of identity of itself as present with its past and future.
In the case of reflection, the For-itself, as the bond
of the reflective consciousness and the consciousness reflected-on, manifests still again its structure as an internal
relation denied the mode of identity of being-in-itself.

For,

44g, 129. The self-relations of the For-itself previously revIewed Sartre considers immediate structures of the
For-itself. Temporality, however, is not an immediate structure ot the For-itselt. For the past as In-itself remains
outside the For--itselt even though the latter gives itself as
beIng Its past in the mode ot non-identity. The relation ot
the For-itself as present to its past is thus highly problematic as a selt-relation.
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while the reflective must be the reflected-on, the reflective
is always ahead of the reflected-on, thereby precluding its
goal of attaining coincidence with the reflected-on, of grasping itself as what it is.

That the reflective is ahead of the

reflected-on means, moreover, that the reflected-on must be in
the past, held as a
itselt.

quasi-ob~ect,

as quasi-outside the For-

The problem here, as with non-thetic temporality, is

the character of the past as In-itself, together with Bartre's
claim that the reflective is the retlected-on in complete immanence, though not in the mode of identity of being-initself. 45 This problematic concerning the relation of the Foritself to its past, of the reflective to the reflected-on,
reveals, however, a fundamental Bartrean thesis regarding the
structure of the For-itself.

But, before the implications of

this problem are considered, it would be well to formulate the
meaning of the For-itselt

~

relation as revealed by the var-

ious selt-relations of the For-itself and to elucidate the
bearing of this formulation upon the further questions concerning substantialization and the ability of the For-itself to
introduce categories of being.
45The problem of immanence, coupled with the In-itself
character of the past, becomes even more acute in impure reflection wherein a shadowy In-itself appears. But more will be
said concerning this problem in a later context.
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That the For-itself is an internal relation of identity
denied has been manifested in each of the self-relations examined.

By formulating the various structures of the For-itself

in terms of relation, Sartre has sought to emphasize the Foritself's "own original non-substantiality, • • • its refusal to
be In-itself. ,,46 Pushing ahead his distinction between the two
regions of being, he further expresses the structure of the Foritself as a relation denied the identity of being-in-itself.
Thus, the phrase--"internal relation of identity deniedn--as
predicated of the Sartrean For-itself appears to signify that
being-tor-itselt has neither the identity nor the substantiali~~

of being-in-itself.
But, while stressing a radical differentiation between

the two regions of being, the Sartrean handling of the Foritselt's self-relations sets the ontological stage for his utilizing the For-itself as the source of such categories as value,
possibility and temporality.

It would appear, however, that

Sartre's consideration of the For-itself as an internal relation of 1dent1ty denied would continue to jeopardize his assignment of this ontological task to the For-itself.

Yet, the self-

relations examined reveal a ver,y interesting point with respect
to this problem.

For, in dealing with these self-relations,

Sartra has clearly expressed that the For-itself

4~, 158.

~

the self to
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which it is present, ![ the value which it seeks,

~

the pos-

sible which it attempts to realize, that the For-itself as
present

~

its past and its future, that the reflective is the

reflected-on--~.Ee.i

itself.

!a. ~ mode 2! identi:tY; 2!. being-in-

This suggests, as does the very notion of self-

relation, that the For-itself has a type of identity with itself, though not the same type of identity as the In-itself.
In other words, Bartre appears to have employed an analogical

concept of identity, though he himself makes no explicit avowal
of an employment of analogy and indeed seems to disavow it by
claiming the principle of identity as a regional principle
governing only the In-itself.

The appearance of analogy, how-

ever, suggests that Bartre may have substantialized the Foritself in an analogous sense, while maintaining its refusal of
the In-itself's substantiality.

If this is the case, then,

perhaps Bartre can maintain a differentiation between the Foritself and the In-itself and still justifiably claim the Foritself as the sources of categories of being qua being.

But,

before the question of substantialization can be considered in
depth, the implications of the problem regarding the relation
of the For-itself to its past, of the reflective to the
retlected-on, must be elucidated.
That the :For-itselt, within the unity of its being,
relates to its past, an In-itselt, points to a more fundamental
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relation which the For-itself is, a relation which 'undercuts the
various self-relations of the For-itself.

As evinced in the

Sartrean "ontological proof," the For-itself exists fundamentally as a relation to In-itself.

In other words, the For-

itself cannot be contained within the arena of self-relations;
the For·-itself' escapes such bounds; the For-itself goes outside
self' an manifested by its circuit of selfness, as manifested
by what was termed its "horizontal" transcendence.

It is this

engagement in the world that must be examined. then, before the
meaning of the For-itself qua relation can be explicated fully
and the issue of substantializatlon taken up.

CHAPl'ER II
THE RELATIONS OF THE FOR-ITSELF IN THE WORLD

The self-relations of the For-itself indicated its relation to beings other than itself.

The discussion of the

circuit of selfness and of the present as presence to beingin-itself explicitly pOinted to what we termed the For-itself's
t1horizontaltl transcendence, its engagement in the world.

To

adequately discern the meaning of the For-itself as relation,
we are thus bound, as Sartre asserts, "to describe the relations
of the for-itself with the in-itself inasmuch as these are
constitutive of the very being of the for-itself."l

In this

context, knowledge, as well as dOing and having, come under
consideration. 2 But there are two other relations which enter
into a discussion of the For-itself's relation with the world:
the For-itself's relation with other consciousnessesand the

l,!!!, 172.
2The For-itself has other relations with the In-itself
in terms of its issuing the categories of being, but these
arise on the foundation of knowledge and need not be considered
in this context. These other relations, however, will be
treated in Chapter II of Part Three, but from the standpoint of
evincing whether the For-itself can bear the metaphysical
burden of issuing categories of being.
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For-itself's relation with its body.3

That these relations of

the engaged For-itself are indicative of the For-itself's fundamental "elsewhere" and/or its refusal of the substantiality
of the In-itself is the Bartrean thesis.
Knowledge
Viewing deduction and discursive argumentation as tools
leading to knowledge, Bartre claims immediacy as the key to
knowledge and declares all knowledge intuitive.

By defining

intuition as "the presence of consciousness to the thing,"4 he
strategically equates knowledge with the being of the Foritself as a relation to In-itself.

Although the "ontological

proof" and the consideration of the present have already manifested this fundamental relation of the For-itself, Bartre
seeks to show the For-itself's refusal of the self-containment
of the In-itself in a more pointed manner--by establishing that
the basic intra-structure of the For-itself, presence to self,
demands the presence of consciousness to In-itself, demands
knowledge as the be ips of the For-itself.
3The ~ustification for considering the relation of the
For-itself to its body in this context rather than as a manifestation of the For-itself's self-relatedness rests with the
fact that the body is the For-itself's point of insertion in
the ~orld and that Bartre himself does not consider the Foritself-body relation in his discussion of the structure of the
For-itself itself.

~, 172.
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Pointing to the evanescence and mutual nihilating of
the terms of the presence to self relation, of the reflectingreflection dyad, Bartre asserts that the For-itself can be
saved from vanishing only if the reflection be "a relation to
an outside which it is not"5_-as a mirror qua reflecting and
its reflection can be maintained only if the reflection relates
to something outside which it is not.

The very being of the

For-itself as presence to self thus requires a relation to that
which it is

~,

to the In-itself.

As presence to In-itself,

the For-itself, moreover, is knowledge, "the very being of the
for-itself insofar as the for-itself has to be its being by
making itself not to be a certain thing to which it is
present. u6 Knowledge, as the being ot the For-itself, is thus
a relation of For-itself to In-itself.

But what type ot re-

lation is knowledge?
That knowledge is a negative relation is evinced by
the fact that consciousness does not lapse into the In-itself
to which it is present.
external or internal.

A negation, however, may be either
For example, to say "This pen is not a

pencil" is to place oneself as a witness present to two beings
which are bound in a purely external way by means of such witnessing; neither the pen nor the pencil is altered by such a

5![, 173.

~, 174.
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bond.

But if one were to say "I am not well," the negation in-

volves neither an independence in being of the terms nor a
third being, a witness, through whom the relation arises; moreover, one is indicating that "not being well" is a negative,
though real, quality of his being, a quality affecting his disposition and so on.
internal negation:

This latter example thus illustrates an
a negation in terms of which the For-itself

qualifies itself by what it is not and thereby alters its very
being.

That knowledge is

~

internal negation is Sartre's

claim.
Prior to pursuing the significance of knowledge as an
internal negation, it would be well, however, to consider
Sartre's statement on the meaning of an internal negation.
In the case of an internal negation • • • it is within

and upon the being which it is not that the for-itself

appears as not being what it is not. In this sense
the internal negation is a concrete ontological bond.
• •• In the internal negation the for-itself collapses on what it denies. The qualities denied are
precisely those to which the for-itself is most
present; it is from them that it derives its negative
force and perpetually renews it. In this sense it is
necessary to see the denied qualities as a constitutive factor of the being of the for-itself? tor the
for-itself must be there outside itself upon them;
it must be they in order to deny that it is they. In
sho'rt the term of origin of the internal negation is
the in-itself, the thing which is there, and outside
of it there is nothing except anemptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing only by a
pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very
content. 7
7.!!!i, 176.
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What, then, is the Sartrean meaning for the For-itself as "internal negation"?

In Sartre's terminology, we might say, the

For-itself, as internal negation, must be the In-itself to which
it is present, not in the mode of being-in-itself, but rather
in the mode of non-being, that is, in its own peculiar mode of
being.

Or, the For-itself exists only in relation to the In-

itself to which it is present, but exists qua For-itself only
by constituting itself as not that In-itself.

Or, still again,

the For-itself exists outside itself in the In-itself to which
it is present.

But what do such statements mean?

Simply, that

the For-itself, as presence to In-itself, as knowledge, as internal negation, cannot exist
radical selt-containment.

~~mode

ot

~

In-itselt's

Man is a being-in-the-world.

sciousness is presence-to-In-1tselt.

Con-

Man determines himself in

relation to his world; the For-itselt grasps itself as lack
and engages in the task of self-construction in relation to the
region of In-itself.

To consider man apart from the world,

to consider consciousness apart from the In-itself is a hopeless
abstraction as seen in the case of the substantial cogito of
Descartes.

But, while the For-itself depends in its being upon

the In-itself, it does not exist as In-itself.

Hence the For-

itself is a relation of internal negation; presence to Initself, knowledge, is the fundamental bond of the For-itself
to the In-itself and it is a bond of being.
This bond, however, is not to be understood as the
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For-itself's relation to a lack or an absence.

For, Sartre

points out, in knowledge, considered as an ontological bond of
being, the For-itself is present to the absolute plenitude of
the contingent In-itself, not an absent In-itself.

In fact, it

is the For-itself which is the lack, the absence, which determines itself in existence from the perspective of this plenitude.

In knowledge, then, the only being encountered is the

known, the massive In-itself.

But, if the bond of the For-

itself to the In-itself cannot be understood in terms of the
For-itself's relation to an absence or lack, neither can it be
understood as continuity or discontinuity.

For, Sartre asserts,

the supposition of an intermediary term in the notion of continuity and the sUbstantialization of the nothing separating
two discontinuous elements preclude the immediacy of the relation of the For-itself to the In-itself evinced in intuition.
How, then, are we to understand the ontological bond which is
knowledge? Sartre answers: "It is pure denied identity.n 8
To illustrate this conclusion, he considers two tangential curves.

If the curves were hidden, save for the length of

their tangency, it would be impossible to distinguish them.
Here, then, there is only pure identity.

But, if one were to

view the curves in their entirety and reconstitute the movement
which made them, each is seen as the negation of the other.

~, 178.

The
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curves are apprehended as two, but with no distance between
them.

Thus, the pure identity is denied.
Though Sartre's illustration leaves something to be

desired,9 the notion of the curves being distinct, though without distance, is meaningful for the being of the For-itself as
knowledge.

For, in knowledge, there is no distance between con-

sciousness and the known; consciousness is the known.

Yet,

there is a distinction between them in that consciousness cannot
simply be what it knows.

For, while the ideal of knowledge is

being-what-one-knows, the structure of the For-itself, as manifested in the reflecting-reflection dyad, is fundamentally notbeing-what-is-known. 10 The For-itself, as knowledge, is thus a
relation to In-itself, a relation whereby consciousness

~

the

known In-itself, but E2i in the mode of being-in-Itself.
The ontological significance of Sartre's discussion of
knowledge, as it bears upon the question of the meaning of the
For-itself qua relation, lies, however, in his claim concerning
the intrinsic dependence of the For-itself upon the In-itself.
For such dependence precludes the For-itself existing in the
9First of all, the two curves could exist in isolation,
which is not the case with the For-itself whose very being depends upon the In-itself. Secondly, the dual nihilating implied in the case of the curves misrepresents the ontological
structure of the In-itself, which ot itself simply is; only the
For-itself nihilates.
-10Cf. ![. 218.
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mode of radical self-containment, self-completion attributed by
Sartra to "substance," to the region of In-itself.
~

basically in virtue

2!~

Hence, it

For-itself's intrinsic dependence

upon In-itself that Sartre designates

~

For-itself "relation,"

rather than tt.substance. II
Doing, Having

~

Being

As manifested in the discussion of knowledge, the Foritself, in virtue of its perpetual nihilation of the contingent
In-itself to which it is present, refuses the substantiality of
being-in-itself.

The For-itself thus exists as lack, as a

desire of being, as a project toward acquiring
density of In-itself.

~

For-itself the

Sartre states:

The for-itself projects being as for-itself, a being
which is what it is. • •• It is as consciousness
that it wishes to have the impermeability and infinite density of the in-itself. It is as the ni-·
hilation of the in-itself and a perpetual evasion
of contingency and of facticity that it wishes to
be its own foundation. • •• The fundamental value
which presides over this project is exactly the initself-for-itself.~l

Supported by, suspended between the contingent In-itself and the
ideal In-itself-For-itself, consciousness exists then as a lack
of the substantiality of the In-itself an4 hence as a desire of
being, as a project to be In-itself-For-itself, to be God.
project of being is thus the fundamental project in terms of
which man acts and defines himself.
ll!m." 566.

The
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Sartre avers, however, that man--as desire--relates not
only to the In-itselt-For-itself, but also to concrete objects
in the world.

That man's relation to the contingent In-itself

from the standpoint of doing and having is

ult~ately

reducible

to his project of being constitutes, moreover, Sartre's thesis.
Upon examination, then, the "cardinal categories of human reality,,12 __ doing , having and being--are intended by Sartre to
evince in still another way that the For-itself must and does
exist as a lack of the substantiality of being-in-itself.
Examining doing first, Sartre seeks to show that doing
is reducible to having.

The simple action ot taking a cigarette

from a pack in order to have it appears to readily attest this
Sartrean tenet.

But Sartre wishes to fortify his case by con-

sidering a variety of human actions, actions which reveal, moreover, not only the reduction of doing to having, but also the
reduction of having to being.
In creating his masterpiece, the artist, Sartre claims,
aims at possessing something which bears the mark of himself and
yet can be encountered in the world.

The research scientist,

too, seeks to appropriate the object known, the discovered truth
in a way that makes it his own and leaves it public for others
to know.

Even in games and sports. Sartre maintains. the

player aims at appropriating--in this case, victory; the skier

12~. 431.
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attempts to master the snow and thereby make it his field of
snow for others to witness.

What do such activities reveal?

Certainly, the reduction of doing to having.

But something more

is manifested by the Sartrean interpretation of these actions.
In each of the actions considered by Sartre, the appropriative character is marked simultaneously by the object's
being a subjective emanation of the For-itself and by its remaining indifferent to the For-itselt, that is, by its remaining In-itselt.

This duality ot the appropriative character

symbolizes the union ot possessor and possessed, the union expressed by the term "mine, n a term which signifies the middle
ground between the utter interiority of the
exteriority of the non-me.

~

and the utter

But this middle ground, Sartre

points out, is nothing other than an attempt to realize value,
,the In-itselt-For-itself.

Thus having, like doing, is not ir-

reducible; having is ultimately reducible to the project ot
being. 1;
While appropriation remains an element, then, in the
various actions of man, what is sought is the realization of
the In-itself-For-itselt, ot selt as selt-cause and as cause of
one's world.

In view of this project of being underlying man's

appropriative etforts, Sartre views appropriation as expressive
of a continuous creative bond between possessor and possessed.

13 Cf.

~,

577-86.
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The possessor is the raison d'etre of the possessed in that he
I

has the object

~_hi_m~se~l_f_and

sustains it as being possessed.

But, while the object, emanating trom the self, exists through
the selt and appears as that selt, the union of self and notself remains ideal, since the very concept of creation--which
establishes the bond of ownership14_-requires that the object
be at once wholly the possessor and wholly independent of that
possessor, an independence which thus precludes a real synthesis
of self and not-self.
~

Hence, the selt's desire to internalize

contingent In-itself through appropriation remains unrealiz-

able.
Emphasizing this unrealizable character of appropriation, Bartre speaks of possession as tta magical relation; I

~

,these objects which I possess, but outside, so to speak, facing
myself; I create them as independent of me; what I possess is
mine outside of me, outside all subjectivity, as an in-itself
which escapes me at each instant and whose creation at each
instant I perpetuate.,,15

The goal of possession, the attempt of

the possessor to enjoy his being-in-itself, to grasp himself as
l4According to Bartre, creation occurs not only when the
possessor makes the object possessed, but also when the possesse
object is bought. For buying an object symbolizes creating the
object; money appears as a creative force. Ct.![, 589-90.
l5![, 591.
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what he is in the possessed, is thus doomed to failure.

As

Bartre states:

"'We see that appropriation is nothing save the
sYmbol of the ideal of the for-itself or value. nl6 The dyad,

For-itself possessing and In-itself possessed, is thus a symbolic relation, a relation symbolizing the unrealizable project
of the For-itself to become In-itself-For-itself. l ? But, how
does appropriation reveal the For-itself qua relation?
Focusing upon appropriation as an internal bond of
being t Bartre claims that this bond demands the non-substantiality of the For-itself.

In oPPosition to substantialist phi-

losophies, he asserts:
The possessed object exists in itself, is defined
by permanence, non-temporality, a sufficiency- of
being, in a word by substantiality. Therefore
we must put unselbstandi~eit on the side of the
possessing su~3ect. I sU:stance cannot appropriate
another substance, and if we apprehend in things
a certain quality of "being possessed," it is
because originally the internal relation of the
for-itself to the in-itself, which is ownership,
derives its origin from the insufficiency of
being in the for-itself.1B

l~, 592.
l7Because appropriation is only- symbolic, Bartre maintains, it does not afford satisfaction and thus the insatiability of possession can give way to destruction of the possessed.
Yet, he claims, destruction is akin to creation, inasmuch as it
seeks to absorb the object in the self. Destruction, in fact,
"realizes appropriation more keenly- than creation does, for the
object destroyed is no longer there to show itself impenetrable." (![, 593)
IBBN

-'

58B.
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In other words, Sartre maintains that the fact of appropriation
can be explained only on the grounds of a lack of being in the
possessor, in the For-itself, since the permanence and selfsufficiency of substance precludes any appropriative tendency.
Thus there is appropriation only because the For-itself, in its
being, is a refusal of the substantiality of being-in-itself, a
refusal which it continually seeks to counter.
That appropriation is "an internal bond of being,,,19 as
rVidenced by various burial customs, by the importance attached
to the property of a famous man, affords Sartre, moreover,
another opportunity to laSh out against substantialist philosophies.

For, as an internal bond of being, appropriation cannot

be construed as an external relation between two substances.
Thus, Sartre avows, appropriation must be non-thetic.

That it

could be otherwise would require a radical, reflective scissiparity on the part of the For-itself--a scissiparity which is
impossible for it

a~

For-itself to achieve.

Moreover, that

appropriation occurs within the circuit of selfness attests its
non-thetic mode of being.

To possess, hence, "does not mean to

know that one holds with the object possessed a relation identified as creation-destruction; rather to possess means to

~

!!!. this relation or better yet to be this relation.,,20 But,
19~, 588.

2o!!" 595.
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how can the For-itself be a "s;ymbolic and ideal n2l relation?
In the first place, that the symbolic relation of appropriation is based upon the real relation which the For-itself
is as a nihilation of In-itself appears to save the For-itself
from collapse into utter ideality.22

In the second place. that

the For-itself is altered in its very being by the appropriative
relation evinces this relation as an internal bond of being.
For, while this alteration does not result in the realization
of the ideal In-itself-For-itself, the For-itself's appropriation through action does result in a further determination of
its essence.

The appropriative relation, however, remains

negative inasmuch as the For-itself must constitute itself as
not that which it possesses. as
in order to possess.

E£!

the SUbstantial In-itself,

Hence, appropriation reveals the familiar

structure of the For-itself:

a relation of internal negation,

a rela'tion which is the being of the For-itself as the continual nihilation of the substantiality of being-in-itself.
2ll!!.. 592.
22In a similar manner, the For-itself-Value dyad is
founded on the For-itselfts nihilation of the contingent Initself and thereby upon its lack of being. For desire as lack
of being, has a single goal--to recover its missing be l ng.
Hence, Bartre claims, the desire to be and the desire to h.ave
are in reality inseparable. The former seeks to confer being
upon the For-itself directly, while the latter attempts to
realize this goal through the mediation of the world in the
circuit of saltness, attempts to appropriate this world across
a particular In-itself. Cf.~, 597-98.
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Being-for-others
Though the For-itself's attempt to transfer itself to
the possessed object in an effort to enjoy its being-in-itself,
its being-outside, is doomed to failure, the For-itself can indirectly grasp that it does have an outside in terms ot its
being-tor-others.

Claiming that "others are the Other, that is
the selt which is E2i myself,p2 3 Bartre declares negation as
constitutive of the being ot others and avers that the Hor-

itself's fundamental connection with the Other must be an internal negation which is a relation of being.24 But what is
the nature of this relation which obtains between the For-itself
and the Other?

Wielding the tundamental intentionality of consciousness
23BN , 230.

-

24Situating his consideration of the Other in terms of
the historical perspective of the problem of solipsism, Bartre
finds the theme of negation as constitutive ot the structure of
the being of others common to the various philosophic interpretations. But he rejects modern philosophy's consideration of
this negation as an external relation between two substances, a
relation through knowledge. For, he comments, not only does
the substantialist perspective preclude any relation with the
Other as Other, as another consciousness, but its option of a
cognitive relation also precludes a revelation of the Other as
subject. While Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger surpassed the endeavor of the moderns by abandoning the postulate ot external
negation, by refusing the substantialist view, they nevertheless failed to recognize, according to Sartre, that the Foritself's relation to the Other cannot be primarily cognitive.
To refute solipsism, the Other must be given as subject. Cf.
1[, 223-52 for Sartre's historical account.
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to elucidate the structure of being-for-others, as well as to
repudiate the solipsistic stance, Sartre claims that the existence of the Other as subject can be secured when and only
when I feel myself becoming an object for him, when I experience
myself as being seen by him.
me?

But what does being seen mean for

What is the significance of the Other's look?
To illustrate this phenomenon, Sartre considers the

situation of peeping through a keyhole.

In such a situation,

my positional consciousness is directed outside myself toward

the scene behind the door.
seen.

I become ashamed.

Suddenly, I hear footsteps; I am
That I am ashamed is an effect of my

being non-thetically aware of myself as existing for another.
The Other makes me

~

for him, pulls me into his world as an

object among objects, confers an In-itself upon me

~

his look.

Establishing my transcendence as a given transcendence, the
Other thus gives me a nature, a limit, an outside, which I am
aware of non-thetically, but which I can never know, never see.
As Sartre states:

"All of a sudden I am conscious of myself as

escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own
nothingness, but in that I have my foundation outside myself.
I am for myself only as I am pure reference to the Other. n25
But, while myself as object escapes me, while I never know my
outside, I nevertheless accept it.
2 5M, 260.

For my shame at being
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caught is a confession that I !!!. this being-outside, that I
enter into a relation with my being-far-others.

Sartre ex-

presses this relation as follows:
The appearance of the look is apprehended by me as an
ekstatic relation at being, 01' which one term is the
"me It as for-itself which is what it is not and is not
what it is, and 01' which the other term is still the
"men but outside my reach, outside my action, outside
my knowledge. 26
~

the Other's look, then, the For-itselt relates to the

which it

~,

but out ot reach.

tf

me "

Here, again, the For-itself is

revealed as a being which precludes the type of cohesive identity 01' the In-itselt and yet identifies

!a some

way with this

"me" which it is outside its reach.
But in what sense is the For-itself's relation with the
Other an internal bond of being?

That my unreflective con-

sciousness apprehends myself insotar as I am an object tor the
Other reveals that the Other's look has struck my very being.
For, through the Other's look, a self comes to appear indirectly
on the unreflective level--"the 'me' but outside my reach," the
"me" of which I am ashamed.

It is in terms of this moditication

then, that Sartre considers the relation between the Other as
subject and me as object an internal relation of being.27
26mt, 268.

-

27Sartre maintains, however, that ubeillfi-for-others is
not an ontological structure of the For-itself. (BN, 282).
For, in terms 01' the For-itselt's immediate structure, the self
as object is prohibited on the unreflective level by the evanescence of the reflecting-reflection dyad.
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The For-itself, however, can reverse this relation with
the Other by looking at the "look" and making the Other obJect •
.In order that the Other appear as object, the For-itself, moreover, must constitute itself as not the Other, must include
lithe being of the Other in its being insofar as its being is in
question as not being the Other. n28

For Bartre, this internal

negation, which constitutes "a unitary bond of being,,29 between
the For-itself and the Other as object, is thus a reinforcement
of the For-itself's selfness and an expression of the Foritself's continual choice of its selfness.

Hence, again, the

For-itself, while denied the mode of identity and independence
of the In-itself, reveals itself as a being having a mode of
identity and a type of independence.
In retrospect, being-for-others requires therefore two

moments, two internal negations which preclude synthesis, since
the Other as subJect and the Other as obJect cannot be united.
If one experiences the Other, one fails to know him; if one
knows the Other, one achieves only his being as object. 30 But,
while the

~thesis

of these two moments remains impossible,

each moment reveals the Sartrean view of the For-itself as relation.

In the first moment, I non-thetically grasp myself as

2~, 283.
29BN

-'

284.

300f • ~, 302.
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object for the Other who is an internal negation constituting
himself as not-me and thereby giving rise to my self-as-object,
the self with which I identify but not in the mode of being-initself.

In the second moment, however, since I remain trans-

cendence for myself, I can refuse myself as object and make the
Other object :!!!. my look.

In this moment, then, I am a rela-

tion of internal negation, choosing and reinforcing my selfness
by rejecting that of the Other.

Hence, while Sartre expresses

the being of the For-itself as "the scattering of being-initself, of a shattered totality, always elsewhere, always at a
distance, never in itself, but always maintained in being by
the perpetual explosion of this totality,"3l the For-itself
continues to affirm itself as a being denied only the specified
mode of identity of being-in-itself, rather than identity per !.!.

Bo~y ~ For-itself. 32
In opposition to the Cartesian dualism. Sartre claims:
"Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly
consciousness. "33

To clarity this claim, he takes as his

31 BN , 300.

-

32Though Sartre considers three dimensions of the body
(the body as For-itself, the body as known by the Other, the
For-itself's non-the tic grasp of itself as a body known by the
Other), our concern is limited to the body as For-itself, since
the other dimensions are structured upon the previously examined relation of the For-itself to the Other.
33m!. 305.
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starting point the primary relation of the For-itself to the
world--knowledge.

Rejecting a pure knowledge, he declares that

knowledge implies a specific point of view and obtains only as
engaged.

But this requires illustration.
I look at this table and see not only the table, but

also the ashtray to the left, the cup of coffee to the right.
That I see these things in a certain order, that my point of
view is limited to seeing a specific profile of this cup, that
these instrumental things are oriented toward me as a center of
reference demands that I appear in the midst of the world, that
I be located, that I be bodied.

As Bartre states:

"The struc-

ture of the world demands that we cannot see without beipg
visible.,,34 But, as my sense of sight seizes these objects in
the world, rather than itself, so, too, with my body as the
center of reference; it is
object for me.

th~t

which I am, but it is never an

It is my point of view upon which I cannot take

a point of view.
As the body of a consciousness engaged in the world,
my body, moreover, must be inserted in the field of instru-

mentality as an instrument.

Yet, Bartre maintains, the body

is not to be construed as a physical instrument utilized by a
soul, since such a utilization would admit an infinite regress
and reduce instrumentality to nonsense.

Thus, my body tor me
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is an instrument which

I~.

My body is lived, neither util-

ized nor known.
Yet, as the For-itself's point of view, as the Foritself's center of reference with respect to a specific instrumental complex, the body is that beyond which the For-itself is
as presence to the object, is that which the For-itself surpasses toward a new complex in its projection toward its possible.

Expressing the implications of the body as surpassed,

Sartre states:
Thus the body, since it is surpassed, is the Past.
It is the immediate presence to the For-itself of
"sensible" things insofar as this presence indicates
a center of reference and is already surpassed either
toward the appearance of a new this or toward a new
combination of in.str'WD.ental-things. In each project
of -the F~r-itselt! in each perception the body is
there; it is the 4mmediate Past insofar as it still
touches on the Present which flees it. This means
that it is at once a point of view and a ;point of
departure--a point 'Of Vlev., a polntO?' !'epartllrewhich
! am ana which at the same time I surpass toward what
I have to be.35
That the body as a point of view, as a point of departure, is
perpetually surpassed reveals, moreover, that the "body is the
contingent form which is taken up by the necessity of my contingency.n36 What does this mean?
Though the contingent form of the For-itself, the body
is the necessary expression of the For-itselfts inability to

3~, 326.
36g" 328.
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found its being.

For, in virtue of this lack, the For-itself

seeks to found itself by engaging in the world and thus requires a body in order to be this point ot view--here.

The

body, therefore, is a manitestation of the For-itself's necessary connection with In-itself, ot the For-itself's facticity.
As that which the For-itself nihilates in its revolt against
contingency, as the nihilated immediate past, the body, in
other words, reters to the For-itselt's original necessary connection with In-itselt--the nihilation ot that primary In-itself
through which the For-itselt was metaphysically born.

Assuming

the For-itself's necessary contingency, then, the body is tfa
permanent structure ot my being and the permanent condition of
possibility ior my consciousness as consciousness of the world
and as a transcendent project toward my future.,,37

What, how-

ever, is the relation of the I'or-itself to its body?
Declaring that consciousness exists its body only as
consciousness, Sartre contends that "the relation ot consciousness to the body is an existential relation. n38 Not an object
of knowledge for the For-itselt, the body belongs to "the
structure of non-thetic self-consciousness. t.39

And yet, as the

m, 328.

37

38mf, 329. The employment of "exist" as a transitive
verb serves to emphasize that the primal relation of consciousness to its body is a lived relation, not cognitive.
39m!., 330.
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nihilated immediate past, the body exists in the mode of Initself and thus cannot be simply identified with the non-thetic
consciousness, with a free project toward its possibilities,
toward its future.

The body for the For-itself, then, appears
to be simultaneously "nothing other than the for-itself tt40 and.
tithe in-itself which is surpassed by the nihilating foritself. ,,41

This bedrock paradox expresses for Sartre two

facets of body-for-itself:

(1) as the For-itself's point of

view and insertion into the world, the body is a necessary manifestation of the For-itself's contingency and thus "nothing
other than the for-itself," and (2) as the point of view on a
specific complex of things, the body is the surpassed, the
nihilated

i~ediate

past, a nihilated In-itself, in the For-

itself's projection toward the future and a new complex of
things.

With regard to this

~econd

point, Sartrp. adds:

"No-

where else shall we come closer to touching that nih11ation of
the In-Itself by the For-itse1f. n42

And yet, though the body,

as the For-itse1f's point of view, is perpetually surpassed,
it is reborn in the very act of surpassing as a point of view
on a new complexus of objects.

There is, then, no ready-made

formula for expressing the For-itse1f's relation to its body.
40BN

-'
4lBN
-'
42BN
-'

309.
309.
333.
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At most one can view this relation as an existential or nonthetic relation through which the For-itself expresses an
identity with its body as its point of view on the world, as
its immediate past, and yet refuses the congealed, solidified
identity of being-in-itself.

The unfolding of the structure of the For-itself in
terms of its relations to the world, as well as its selfrelations, discloses that Bartre employs the term "relation"
to designate the For-itself as a being which is refused the
substantiality, the mode of radical self-containment of the Initself.

Perhaps, Bartre's most acute tour

~

force against

the abstraction of a self-enclosed For-itself lies in his
avowal of the dependence of the For-itself's self-relations
upon its relations to the world.

This Bartrean strategy is

thus sufficiently significant to deserve brief consideration.
Recall, presence to self--the primary self-relation
through which the For-itself found its nothingness--requires,
according to Bartre, the For-itself's presence to In-itself in
the form of an existential relation of knOwledge. 43 Only on
the foundation of the For-itself relating to In-itself, then,
is presence to self--the basic, immediate structure of the Foritself--sustained.

Moreover, because presence to self reveals

43Cf. above, 64.
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the For-itself as lack and constitutes, in turn, the necessary
condition for the upsurge of the lacked (value) and the lacking
(the For-itself's possible), all of the immediate selfrelations of the For-itself refer ultimately to its metaphysical
birth as the nihilation of a primary In-itself and its continual nihilation of the In-itself with which it engages in the
world.

Hence, not even in terms of its immediate self-

relations can the For-itself be considered a self-contained
thing.
For Bartre, then, the For-itself must be viewed as a
lived relation suspended between the contingent In-itself which
it perpetually nihilates and the In-itself-For-itself toward
which it perpetually projects itself.

Its being as temporality,

moreover, reveals a similar structure, for the For-itself as
present is a relation suspended between its past from which it
flees44 and its future toward which it projects itself. Implicit in this self-relation of temporality is, again, the Foritself's nihilation of the In-itself and projection toward the
In-itself-For-itself.
In a striking repudiation ot the Cartesian, substantial
cogito, Bartre claims that even the self-relation of reflection
44Though the body as surpassed is past and thereby Initself, Bartre contends that the body is also a non-thetic
structure of consciousness. But from this latter standpoint,
the For-itself non-thetically grasps its body only through the
indication of the instrumental things in the world. In this
sense, a self-relation is again seen to be revealed in terms of
an engagement in the world.
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arises only in terms of the For-itself's engagement in the
world.

Because reflection consists in a dual effort to make

the reflected-on an object and to appropriate it, the reflective consciousness seeks to view the reflected-on from the outside, to see itself as the Other sees it.

But this attempt

presupposes that the For-itself has been seen and has nonthetically grasped itself as having an outside.

Moreover, the

goal of appropriation implicit in the reflective effort has as
its primary analogate the For-itself's appropriative relations
to the In-itself.

Hence, reflection, though a self-relation,

is dependent upon the For-itself's relation to the Other and to
the world.
That the For-itself's self-relations imply its engagement in and across the world evinces unequivocally tor Sartre
that any treatment of the For-itself as a self-enclosed thing,
existing in the same manner as the In-itself, is a hopeless
abstraction.

As previously stated, to convey that the For-

itself is refused the In-itself's mode of self-containment, of
substantiality, Sartre desigIl!ltes the For-itself "relation."
Included in the Sartrean polemic against the substantialists
are, moreover, significant ontological implications.

The For-

itself has repeatedly been characterized as a relation of internal negation, as a relation of identity denied.

The re-

lation which is being-for-itself, furthermore, has been found
to be a dynamic activity in terms of which the For-itself
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determines and defines its essence.

That the term to which the

For-itself relates remains static reveals, moreover, that the
For-itself is a univocal relation. 45 But what are the ontological implications of a relation characterized by internality,
negativity and univocity?
The demands upon a relation which is internal are
usually twofold:

(1) each term must affect the other in its

being and (2) each term must thereby be included in the being
of the other.

Because Sartre considers the For-itself a univ-

ocal relation, however, the term which the For-itself includes
in its being, the term which affects the For-itself in its
being, need not itself include or be affected in its being by
the For-itself.

Take, for example, a man who has a general

grasp of the contemporary, world situation.

That situation

nei ther includes this man in its being nor is affected directly
by the fact that the man knows it.

The internality of this re-

lation is thus only one-sided, on the side of the For-itself.
But the character of this internality must be further explored.
That this man adopts certain attitudes toward life,
toward his fellow man, toward himself evinces that what is known
has affected him at the heart of his being, that what is known
450f • 1m, 284, 308. The notable exception to this univocity is the relation of being-tor-others. But in an effort
to find a general meaning of the For-itself as relation, one
can only note exceptions.
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is included in his being.
nomena is to say that he

For the only way to explain such phe-

II what

he knows, that he exists the

contemporary situation, that he non-thetically lives what he
knows.

But yet, while he

II what

he knows, he does not collapse

into baing simply what he knows, since this would involve his
slipping into In-itself and ceasing to be For-itself.

The For-

itself, then, while including what is known in its being and
while being affected intrinSically by what is known, nevertheless constitutes itself as E£l being simply what is known.
The For-i tsel!, in other words,

!!. what it knows, but not in

the solidified mode of being-in-itself.

For the For-itself

includes in its being the term to which it relates in the only
mode ontologically open to it--in the mode of non-being, in the
mode of flight, in the mode of For-itself.

As Sartre states of

the For-itself's futile attempt to gain the self-coincidence
and

self-containment of the In-itself:

"I want to grasp this

being and I no longer find anything but m.yse'.!... 46

But this is

the fate of the For-itself in its relations to the world, as
well as its self-relations. 47 For the For-itself is a being
which is intrinsically affected by a term that is included in
its being, but not in the concrete mode o! identity of beingin-itself. Whether the term be the self to which it is present,

46g:,

218.
470f • the summary ot Chapter I of Part Two tor a review
ot the For-itself's failure to achieve the selt-coincidence ot
the In-itself even in its selt-relations.
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the In--itself-For-itself, its horizon of possibles, its past,
its future, the consciousness reflected-on, its body, the concrete In-itself which it knows and appropriates or the Other,
the For-itsel! relates to it in a bond of being, a bond in
terms o! which it is intrinsically altered, a bond in terms of
which it constitutes itself as this For-itself by its non-thetic
grasp that it is
itself.

a2i

any

of these terms in the mode of In-

Ahead of itself, behind itself, outside itself:

the

For-itself finds itself only as flight, as lack, as a being dependent in its being upon the region of In-itself, as a being
dependent in its process of self-construction upon the various
terms cited, as a being whose being is diasporatic, as a being
refused the solidification, identity, self-containment and
fullness of being-in-itself.
For Sartre, that the For-itself is what it is not and
is not what it is conveys its meaning as a relation of internal
negation, as a relation of identity denied.

That the For-

itself be conceived in this way stems ultimately from the Bartrean perspective of its metaphysical birth as the nihilation
of an In-itself.

But there are certain options that Bartre

made with regard to this metaphysical phenomenon.

That the

For-itself be an internal relation was his option when confronted with the alternative of a self-contained substance
entering into only external relations and existing in the mode

9l
ot the Bartrean In-itself.

This primal rejection of such a

substantialist view of the For-itself constitutes the foundatio
for Bartre's refusal to attribute to the For-itself the substantial characteristics of the In-itself.

But, while refusing

the For-itself the same mode of substantiality as the In-itself,
has Bartre actually refused it

~mode

of substantiality?

From the examination of the For-itselt's self-relations
in the preceding chapter, it can be ascertained that the Foritself sustains its relationality within the unity of its being
and possesses

~mode

of identity with the terms to which it

relates in virtue of the very character ot self-relations.
Bartre repeatedly asserts that the For-itself

~

That

each of the

terms to which it relates, but not in the mode of In-itself,
turther suggests that the For-itself has

~

type of identity.

Moreover, the Sartrean avowal that the For-itself, in making the
Other be as object for it, reinforces its seltness and expresses
a continual choice of its selfness indicates again that the Foritself grasps a mode of identity with itself
addition, that the For-itself has

~mode

and

evinces, in

of independence.

Furthering this view of the For-itself existing in a mode of
independence is the Bartrean option to consider the For-itself
an internal relation of negation.
constituting itself as

~

For it is solely in terms of

simply that to which it relates that

the For-itself constitutes itself as a this.

Then, too, it is
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in terms of its nihilating activity that the For-itself can
never simply be the In-itself that it knows and seeks to appropriate.

Since the For-itself, therefore, does not lapse into

the being of the In-itself which it knows and seeks to appropriate, it appears to have a certain mode of independence from
the In-itself.

Finally, Bartre's declaration that the For-

itself is freedom suggests a mode of independence accruing to
the being of the For-itself.

Hence, once again, the question

arises as to whether Sartre has substantialized the "relation"
which is For-itself. 48

~cause this final paragraph was intended to s~gest,
on the basis of the considerations of Part Two, that Sar~
might be attributing to the For-itself characteristics analoto the substantial In-itself, no documentation was offered.
o reat 5,1stematically this question concerning the substantialization of the For-itself and to provide the necessary
documentation is the task of Part Three.

,OUt

PART THREE

THE FOR-ITSELF:

SUBSTANTIAL OR NON-SUBSTANTIAL?

CHAP.I!ER I

IS THE FOR-ITSELF SUBSTANTIALIZED?

As disclosed by the examination of the structure of the
For-itself, the Sartraan declaration that the For-itself is
relation has as its principal target the substant1alist equation
of human reality with a salt-contained thing.

In rejecting

this equation, Sartre claims transcendence as the chief characteristic of human reality and denounces the substantialist
illusion as a hopeless abstraction.

He holds that the sub-

stantialist denial of the internal relationality of the being
of man constitutes a failure to consider the fact of man's
dependence on being-in-itself for the data with which he works
in the process of self-construction, as well as for the very
foundation of his being.

He contends that the substantialist

identification of human reality with what it is at any given
instant neglects to take into account the dynamism of man as a
being which is teD'.!porality, as a being which forges its own
essence, as a being which is perpetually ahead of this selfconstructed essence in pursuit ot further possibles, in pursuit
of the In-itself-For-itself.

Ultimately, the Sartrean polemic

against the substantialists rests with his view that both the
project of man--to be a consciousness which has the
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substantiality of the In-itself--and the actions in terms of
which man seeks to realize this project are explicable only if
man is considered as a lack of the substantiality of the Initself or, in Sartrean terms, non-substantial.
Yet, it was observed in the closing paragraph of the
preceding section that Sartre, while maintaining the Foritself's lack of the mode of substantiality of being-in-itself,
nevertheless appears to provide the For-itself with a type of
unity, identity, "thisness" and independence--in short, with a
type of substantiality.

A question thus arises as to whether

Sartre has substantialized the For-itself in a mode analogous
to that of the In-itself.

The philosophical import of this

question lies not only in its immediate metaphysical ramifications, but also in its bearing upon the Sartrean utilization
of the For-itself as the source of traditional categories of
being.

For, with regard to this latter point, the establish-

ment of a Sartrean employment of an analogous notion of substance would mitigate his declaration of a radical distinction
between the two rf;gions of being and would thus make plausible
his wielding of the For-itself to issue categories of being.
In an effort to resolve the question concerning whether the
For-itself can bear the ontological burden of issuing the categories of being. it hence bec.,)mes necessary to azcel'tain first
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whether Sartre has substantialized the For-itself.
In handling this question of a possible Sartrean substantialization of the For-itself, it would be advantageous to
consider initially a selective, historical sketch of the notion
of substance, for

SllCh

an approach would provide a review of

traditional characteristics assigned to substance and would
afford a sharper focus upon Sartrets own historical context for
his polemic against substantialist philosophies.

It is neces-

sary, moreover, to re-examine the Sartrean consideration of the
For-itself to see whether Sartre actually stocks the For-itself
with characteristics analogous to those substantial characteristics ascribed to the In-itself and/or recorded in the history
of

philosop~.

Such are the concerns of this present chapter.

The following chapter will further pursue this issue of the
substantialization of the For-itself, but from the standpoint
of a consideration of the ontological status of the For-itself
as it is operat1've in the Sartrean account of the issuance of
the categories of being.

The attempt to settle the question of

substantializat10n and the ultimate question concerning whether
the For-itself can bear the ontological burden of originating
the categories of being will be delayed, however, to Part Four.

97

!

Historical Sketch 2!~ Notion of Substance l
Pervading the treatment of substance throughout the

history of philosophy is an ambiguity regarding the meaning of
the term "substancen--an ambiguity originating with Aristotle.
For Aristotle used this term to designate not only the indivicl1.1al thing, l)ut a.lso the essential nature common to many
things. 2 This duality of signification, however, need not concern us directly, since our interest lies principally with the
characterization of substance as the individual thing.
Regarding substance as the individual thing, Aristotle
claimed that substance can be said to exist apart or have an
independence in mode of being only if considered as the whole
thing inclusive of qualities.

Since the qualities "are not

somet'h:tTlJ!: outside it which it needs in addition to itself',"3
the Aristotelian substance is thus self-contained.
pressed in other words:

Or, as ex-

"The individual alone is that which

belongs to itself only, which is not borne up by some other,
lIn this presentation of select notions of substance
voiced in the his~.;ory ot philosophy, secondary sources are being
employed in order to allow one freedom from involvement in the
problematic of substance as it grips the various systems. In
cases where Sartre himself bas put forth interpretations of historical notions of substance, the Sartrean interpretation will
be employed. Our chief interest in this section lies only in
a listing of characteristics ascribed to substance.
2Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London:

Ltd., 1956), 165.

3Ibid •

Methuen & Co.,
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which is what it is by reason of itself, and not upon the basis
of some other being. n4 This mode of independence in being,
moreover, attests that "individual substances cannot be relative.,,5

Chief among the characteristics of Aristotelian sub-

stance, then, are "thisness," independence, non-relationality
in mode of being and determination--both in the sense of a
"whatness" and singularity.6 The Aristotelian "this here thing:
however, is always more than what it is essentially, is always
more than a "such ... 7 Furthering this notion and the Aristotelian repudiation of change as

~

bare succession, it has

further been suggested that the ability to admit contrary qualifications be affirmed as a chief characteristic of Aristotelian
4B• Costelloe and J. Muirhead Aristotle and the Earlier
Peri~atetics, I (New York: Russell RUssell, Inc.,~62).
331- 2. ThIs statement expresses well the type of view of substance which Sartre refuse s the For-i tse1t • In this regard. it
is interesting to comiare it with Sartrean statements concerning the For-itself:
Consciousness is born sUiPorted by a
being which is not itself." (RN,! lxi) Again,consciousness is
a being such that in its beibf-;-l.ts b_~~ 1~ in mstion In so
Yar as thIs beiI! apnes a eing otlieF'thiii I'tse ." Qltr,Iiiir- Ahd, sti again, "ine tOr-itself Without the in-itself
is a kind ot abstraction; it could not exist ~ more than a
color could exist without form • • • " (![. 621)

&

5Ibid., 287.

Cf. also 289.

6Cf• J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian
Meta,bysics (Toronto: PontIfical In'St"itute ol"'11itrreva1 StUdies,
1957 ~91, tor a further listing ot characteristics of Aristotelian substance.

7CI • J. H. Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York:
University Press. 1960), 11;-18.

Columbia
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substance. 8

Hence, independence, individuality, determination,

non-relationality in mode of being and ability to admit contrary qualities emerge as the primary characteristics of substance as viewed by Aristotle.
These characteristics ascribed to substance by Aristotle are affirmed also by St. Thomas Aquinas, though there is
a difference in perspective in the latter's discussion in terms
of his inSight into "esse."
designate a

metap~sical

Whether "substance" be used to

principle of being or an individual

thing, Aquinas demands its being considered in relation to
"esse."

Substance, as a

metap~sical

principle, he defines as

the essence of a thing as directly related to "esse," and thus
as the principle by which the being is determinate.

As a meta-

physical principle distinct from accidents, substance, moreover, is the potential principle by which the being admits of
contrary quali£ications within the determinate limits of its
essence.

Hence, determinateness and the capability to admit

contrary qualifications accrue to the individual thing in
virtue of the metaphysical principle of substance.
This being--the individual thing--Aquinas also terms
"substance."

"Substance is the thing in its necessary role of

independent existence."9 Because finite substances, however,
SOf. Ross, Aristotle, 24, 166.
9R• E. McOall, The Reality of Substance, A Dissertation
--Philosophical Studies:--ko. 1GB (gashlngton: The Oatholic
University of America Press, 1956), 50.
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are caused beings, "the independent existence proper to substance means independence not as to cause but as to mode. nlO
Independence as to mode of existenoe thus ranks with determinateness and the oapability to admit contrary qualifications in
characterizing substanoe.

Moreover, in view of the Thomistio

notion of signate matter, individuation, too, comes to rest
upon substance.

Then, too, because Aquinas views being as con-

vertible with the transcendental one, substance--as the whole
thing--must be actually undivided in itself.
In addition to these characteristics of Thomistic substance, one more should be ci ted--identi ty.

According to

Thomistic philosophy, substance constitutes:
• • • the concrete expression of the principle of
identi ty. Wi thout substanoe there is no lim1 t
placed on the number of predications, because there
is never aQ1thing at which a final point must be
reached for the two mutually exclusive alternates:
being so or not so. • •• The eternal dichotomy
of something or nothing pushes its roots into substance. ll
This consideration of identity is intrinsically bound to the
Thomistic account of accidental change, since substance--as a
metaphysical principle--is viewed as the enduring substrate, as
10Ibid., 148.

llIbid., 54. This statement expresses well the type of
substantiallst view which Sartre refuses the For-itself. For
the view of substance as the determinant regarding whether a
thing is so or not so, is incompatible with the being of the
For-itself, since the For-itself, as transcendence, reaches a
final point only when it ceases to be transcendence, only in
death.
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the permanent, throughout such a change. 12

But so much for the

Thomistic doctrine of sUbstance.
The historical setting for Bartre's own polemic with
substantialist

ph1losopr~e~

is provided by the period of modern

philosophy and, within that period, by Descartes in particular.
Refusing a univocal predication of substance to God and created
things, Descartes distinguished between absolute substance,
that which exists in and of itself. God, and relative substance,
that which is cau.sed in existence, mind and body. 13

Wi th

respect to mind and body, however, he em.ployed a univocal concept of substance.

Relative substance, whether m1nd or body,

he averred, can be termed such to the extent that it is the
support of the qualities which inhere in it.

Moreover, as sup-

port, relative substance is the unChanged throughout Change. 14
120f• G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., Introduction to the PhilOSOjhY ~ ~ (2nd ed., New York: IppIeton-Cintliry-Cro:r=es;196:r~9~or a further account of substance, cf. 243-51.

It may be said, by wq of suggestion, that this view of substance as the enduring sub~ect ot accidental change tends to
mitigate the Thomistic view of substance as a ~tential principle which, when actualized by accidents, is ~ principle by
which the being exists according to a new, accidental modification. This point will be further developed, however, in a
later context.

l3Th1s view ot a non-univocal predication of "substance"
to God and created things is posited also by Aquinas. It is in
terms of this distinction that the independence of created
things is restricted to mode of existence.

l~he consideration of substance as the unchanged was
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But, in addition to being characterized as an unchanged sub·-strate, relative substance, as revealed by the Cartesian
possession of clear and distinct ideas, exists independently of
other such substances. Each is simply what it is in total selfcontainment. 15 Thus the Cartesian relativ0 substance emerges as
an insular, permanent "what-it-is. tt

It is precisely this type

of substantiality which Sartre denies the For-itself.
Bartre's comments in repudiation of the substantiality
of the Cartesian cosito further a sharpening of focus on his
issue with substantialists.

He states:

tiThe ontological error

of Cal'tesian rationalism is not to have seen that if the absolute is defined by the primacy of existence over essence, it
can not be conceived as a substance.
substantial."IG

Consciousness has nothing

In terms of this statement, Sartre rejects the

Cartesian claim to have made the cosito an object of knowledge,
for such a claim, according to Sartre, entails the petrification of the cogito into a "what-it-is.1I

Sartre contends, more-

over, that the Cartesian cosito fails to express the dynamism of
prevalent in the classical period of modern philosophy. Locke,
for example, also treated substance as the bare, faceless, inert support of qualities. Then, too, for Kant, substance was
equated with the noumenon "behind It the phenomenon, with the unchanged "behind" the changing.
l5For a discussion ot the Cartesian doctrine ot substance, cf. J. D. Collins, A Historr ot Modern European Philosoppy (Milwaukee: Bruce,J.<)61), 7;=83.
1
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the being of consciousness.

"It preserves the character of

being-in-itself in its integrity, although the for-itself is
its attribute. This is what is called Descartes' substantialist
illusion. Hl ? This is the illusion which the Sartrean consideration has sought to repudiate.

As Sartre states:

"This being,

under our observation, has been transcended toward value and
possibilities; we have not been able to keep it within the substantial limits of the instantaneity of the Cartesian cogito ... 18
In virtue of the dynamic temporality of the For-itself, moreover, "the Cartesian cogito ought to be formulated rather:
think; therefore I was. ,"19

II

For the Cartesian, reflective

cogito, according to Sartre, cannot be in a congealed mode ot
identity with the consciousness-retlected-on; it must be ahead
ot the retlected-on, thereby placing the latter in the immediate
past. 20 Thus, trom Sartre's perspective, the being ot the Foritself continues to refuse the Cartesian predication of substantiality, continues to refuse the Cartesian abstraction of

l?m, 84.

l~, 104. Ct. also 84-85 131-35, 156 tor Sartre's
turther comments on the instantaneIty of the Cartesian cor-to.
It should be noted, moreover, that the Sartrean cogito di fers
from the Cartesian cogito as the non-thetic consciousness conditioning the latter.
Part One, 10-11.

cl.

19BN', 119.

-

20Cf• Part Two, Chapter I, 48-53 for the foundation of
this Sartrean criticism of the Cartesian cosito.
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instantaneity.

Moreover, in view of the Bartrean consideration

of the relationality of the For-itself, the For-itself emerges
as a being which is denied the Cartesian cogito's selfcontainment and radical independence from the world.
states:

As Bartre

"There is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world

on the other as two closed entities for which we must subsequently seek some explanation as to how they communicate. The
for-itself is a relation to the world. n2l From this abbreviated
sketch of the Bartrean critique ot the Cartesian cogito, then,
it can be attested that Bartre's

re~ection

ot substantiality

for the For-itselt has as its target the type ot substantiality

ot Descartes' cogito--a selt-contained, permanent "what-it-is."
It is thus the Cartesian notion ot substance which Bartre rejects when he avows the non-substantiality of the For-itself.
It is, moreover, in terms ot the Bartrean adoption of the Cartesian notion ot substance in his characterization ot the Initselt that Bartre views the For-itself as lacking the substantiality ot the In-itselt.

But what, specitically, are the

substantial characteristics which Bartre himselt attributes to
being-in-itselt, to the region of substance?
In virtue of his regional view of substance t Bartre
claims that only the In-itself "exists in itself, is defined by
permanence, non-temporality, a sufficiency of being, in a word
2l!!,., 306.
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by substantiality."22

That being-in-itself exists in itself

is, moreover, an affirmation of its independence, the primary

characteristic o! substance for Bartre, as well as for

Aristotle, Aquinas and

Deae~·~es.

As

Bartre states:

"It is

this independence which constitutes in the in-itself its
character as a thing.n 23 The independence of the In-itsel!,
however, refers not to that o! a causa ~,24 but rather to
the mode of being o! the In-itself.

For, as "fully !ormed,"25

the In-itsel! is what it is and thus requires no relation to
other things.26

It is the principle o! identity, moreover,

which expresses this self-containment and permanent determinateness o! the In-itsel!.

A regional prinCiple o! being,

aooording to Bartre, the prinoiple of identity designates "the
opaoity o~ being-in-itself,n 27 "the negation of every
speoies o.! relation at the heart of being-in-itself.,,28 In
terms of this solidified mode of identity, in terms of its
22!!,. 588.

23!!" 506.
240f • EN, lxiv, 620. It is Bartre's contention that
the In-itsel! wourcf have to be consciousness in order to found
itselt and thus that the In-itself oannot be a causa sui.
Though he repudiates any theory ot divine creation as-explanatory of the In-itselt, he presoinds from making a definitive
statement as to the foundation ot this region of being.

2~, 174.
260!. mi. lxvi.
27•• lxvi.

2ami
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bedrock permanence, being-in-itself, furthermore, is beyond
change and thus beyond temporality.

Hence, independence, de-

terminateness, identity, permanence, non-relationality and nontemporality emerge as the characteristics of the realm of Initself, the realm. of Sartrean substance. 29
In terms of this historical consideration of select
notions of substance, it can be ascertained that the following
characteristics are commonly ascribed to sUbstance:

indepen-

dence as to mode or being, identity, unity, determinateness,
permanence and non-relationality.

In addition to such common

denOminators, the potentiality to admit contrary accidents
should also be cited as a distinctive feature of the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrines of substance. 30 These characteristics, however, suggest only guidelines for approaching the

29With respect to non-relationality substantialist philosophies, in general, admit external relatIons as compatible
with substance, though they reject internal relations. Sartra,
however. in line with his general thesis that the For-itselt
issues all categories of being, claims that the In-itself can
enter into external relations only on the grounds of a Foritself's presence to it. ct. Bit ??, 362. Nevertheless, the
important point with regard to non-relationality is the denial
ot internal relatioDs for ~~ substance and on this point Sartre
concurs with traditional substantialist philosophies.
30It is interesting to note that this admission or such
a potentiality for substance does not deter Aristotle and
Aquinas from using substance as the focal point ot a thing's
independence, un1 ty, identity and permanence. For it appears
paradoxical that those who consider substance as a potential
for turther actualization and those who consider it as the bedrock unchanged nevertheless are agreed on the function of substance with respect to these other characteristics. But this
point will be reconsidered in Part Four.
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question concerning whether the Sartrean For-itself is substantialized in a manner analogous to the In-itself.

To pro-

ceed more directly on the road to a resolution of this issue,
it is necessary to re-examine the Sartrean For-itself from the
standpoint of such guidelines.
Characteristics of the For-itself:
substantIal?
- -

.

-

Substantial- or Non-----........................ - ................

In reconsidering the Sartrean For-itself in terms of
the question of substantialization, it should be noted at the
outset that Sartre himself does not claim to have wielded an
analogous notion ot substance.

This faot, together with his

repeated repudiation of the substantialist illusion, suggests
that, if the substantialization of the For-itself be ultimately
affirmed, the affirmation will go beyond any deolaration within
the Sartrean system.

Moreover, in terms of Sartre's refusal

to use substance--a "what-it-is"--as a "caricature"3l for the
independence, un! ty, identi ty and permanence of human reality,
an affirmation of a Sartrean, substantialized For-itself would
imply a suggestion of different ways in which a substance can be
said to have independence, unity, identity and permanence and
would thus have significant metaphysical ramifications for a
general doctrine of substance, as well as for an explicit
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working out of the analogy of substance. 32

But let us re-

examine the For-itself.
The review of historical doctrines of substance has
revealed independence as the principal characteristic of substance and has thus provided us with a starting point in our
inquiry concerning the substantialization of the For-itself.
Such Sartrean assertions as "the for-itself is in no way an
autonomous substance,·33 "the for-itself without the in-itself
is a kind ot abstractionu34 would appear, however, to eradicate
any hope of attributing independence to the For-itself.
Sartre's account of the metaphysical birth of the For-itself as
a nibilation ot a particular In-itself. together with his ontological proof, moreover, would appear to efface independence
from the being of the For-itself. 35 And yet, while the Foritself is intrinsically bound to the In-itself, it nevertheless
constitutes itself as B2l in the mode of being-in-itself that
In-itself to which it is present.

Thus the Sartrean For-itself

manifests itself as .........
not the things to which it is present,
32In addition to these general metaphysical implications
stemming from the issue of substantialization, there is, moreover, the point with which we are particularly concerned, namely
whether a substantialization of the For-itself would make more
plausible the Sartrean employment of the For-itself to issue the
categories of being.
33.......
BN , 618 •

~, 621.
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as independent from these things, but this independence is revealed only on the ground of its fundamental dependence.

This,

however, requires further consideration.
The Sartrean account of the For-itself's relations to
the world revealed a common theme bearing significantly upon the
question of the For-itself's independence.

For Bartre averred

that every relation which the For-itself sustains with the Initself and the Other in its effort to be In-itself-For-itself
flings the For-itself back upon j.tself as this For-itself, as
always other than the beings to which it relates.
states:

As Bartre

"I want to grasp this being and I no longer find any-

thing but !lself. n36

That I do not collapse into the being of

what I know, into the being of what I act upon, into the being
of what I possess thus attests a real independence in being on
my part.

Then, too, since I never attain the unitary synthesis

of myself and In-itself which is the In-itself-For-itself, my
independence from the In-itself is further evinced.

Bartre

himself, in speaking of the For-itself's failure to realize the
ideal synthesis of In-itselt-For-itself, asserts:

"It is this

perpetual failure which explains both the indissolubility of the
in-itself and of the for-itself and at the same time their relative independence. H3? The For-itself is thus considered by

3~, 218.

3?mr, 623.
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Sartre to have an independence in being.

But

my

independence as

For-itself is such that it does not eradicate

my

real dependence

on the In-itself and Others in my task of self-construction; my
independence, in other words, is such that it does not deny that
my relations to the world are demanded by my being as a con-

sciousness of something other than itself.

Hence, the inde-

pendence of the Sartrean For-itself--its being other than others
to which it relates--is an independence which asserts itself
across the field of the For-itself's fundamental dependence
upon the world.
The Sartrean claim that the For-itself is freedom,
moreover, develops this same theme--an independence in the face
of dependence.

For, in virtue ot the For-itselt's relation to

In-itself, freedom exists only in situation.

Freedom, as the

For-itself's independence, then, emerges in the context of the
For-itself's dependence on In-itself.
my

freedom assert

my

But, in what way does

independence from the particular things to

which I relate in my concrete situation?
While I always exist in a concrete situation, while I
always exist in relation to the things within that situation,
my treedom is the source of my making these things exist for

me.

It is my freedom which allows me to crystallize an end

aeross a given and to provide a new meaning for that given in
the light of

my

end.

For example, in walking along the shore,
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I detect sea-shells and choose to collect some and use them for
decorative purposes in my home.

By removing them from.their

natural locale, by incorporating these things into my concrete
project, I assert my independence from them by making them exist
for me.

It is my freedom which is my possibility of detachment

from things as they are, which is my choice of a concrete change
to be bestowed on a concrete given, which is my assertion of independence in the face of dependence.
In virtue of m::i. fr'aecionl, "Ilf3' concrete proJects, moreover,

are always open, always contain the possibility of further modifications.

If I am driving down a road en route to an appoint-

ment and suddenly discover that the road ahead is strewn with
fallen branches, through my initiative I can act upon these
givens which offer resistance to the realization of my end.
can cast them aside and proceed on my way.

I

My freedom thus re-

veals itselt as a spontaneity "beyond reach" ot things in my
situation and thus as independent ot the se things.
a spontaneity "beyond reach" and yet ",!! having !2.

Hence, as
~

with some-

thing other than itself,,,38 freedom affirms that the For-itself
is independent in the sense of being other than others and in
the sense of dominating other things.39
In terms of this discussion, then, it can be said that

3~, 506-507.
39This discussion of freedom is based upon the Sartrean
account presented in ![, 433-556.
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Sartre does provide the For-itself with an independence in
being.

As he states of the For-itself:

I1It

'is' in the mode

of For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it
reveals itself as not being being, ,,40 that is, as not being
being-in-itself.

He defines a free existent, moreover, as "an

existent which as consciousness is necessarily separated from
all others because they are in connection with it only to the
extent that they are I!l:E..

ll. ,,41 This independence which Sartre

ass:!.gns to human reality, however, does not involve a se11sufficiency in being, is not the same as the independence of a
stone.

F0r to exist as For-itself, as a consciousness of some-

thing other than itself, demands internal relations to the
world.

Yet, Sartre maintains that the For-itself's dependence,

expressed in terms of its internal relations to the world, does
not deny its real independence, since the very positing ot internal relations involves the "positing of an otherness H42 and
thus involves the For-itself's non-thetic grasp ot itselt as
other than this otherness, that is, as independent.
The independence ot the For-itself, moreover, in securing the For-itself's dividedness from others, secures a
dimension ot what is traditionally termed "unity."

~, 123.
4l!!" 453.
42§!, 77.

For the 2.B!.
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is defined as that which is actually undivided in itself and
divided trom others.

But, while independence manifests the

For-itselt's dividedness from others, in what sense can the
actual undividedness of the For-itself be affirmed?

That Sartre

does affirm the For-itseltts unity can be evinced by turning to
virtually

a~

page ot

however, remains:

B~~

Nothingness.

The question.

in what sense can a being which is what it

is not and is not what it is be considered as actually undivided
in 3elf7
A reconsideration o! the self-relations of the Poritself reveals that, although the For-itself has distinct
I1di:ruensions." it nevertheless admits of an interpenetration of
its dimensions.

Recall, the reflecting-reflection dyad. the

For-itsel!-value dyad. the For-itselt-possible relation and the
reflective-reflected-on relation each

man1feste~

a distinction

of terms. but wi thin the bounds of a fundamental interpenetration.

For in each relation neither term could achieve actual
independence from the other. 43 But. if there is no actual

43Por a discussion ot each of these self-relations. cf.
Part Two, Chapter I. It should be noted that Sartre formulates
these selt-relations in terms of the Por-itselt's retusal ot
the same mode of identitz as that o! the In-itself. To the extent that identity Is oneness with selt, these selt-relations,
however, can be considered from the standpoint of an analofous
predication of un1~ Moreover, it the Sartrean For-Itsei Is
discovered to be ac
lly undivided in itself,in a mode analogous to the unity of the In-itself. this would be suggestive of
its identity--the ·'1 am I.tt The question-of the For-itself's
identity. however, must be considered separately.
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independence of the terms which the For-itself sustains in its
self-relations, then the For-itself must be a being which is
actually undivided or one.
The Sartrean view of the For-itself as nthe being which
has to be its being in the diasporatic form of Temporality,n 44
however, poses a problem with respect to the question of the
For-itself's unity, since Sartre considers the past as Initself, as substance. 45 Yet, the Sartrean account of temporality affirms the unity of the For-itself inasmuch as the Foritself as present is conditioned by its past and its future as
much as it conditions them. 46 Hence, again, Sartre maintains a
type of interpenetration as coming to bind the For-itse1f's
distinct dimensions: "None of them can exist without the other
two. n47 If, then, none can achieve actual independence, can
exist actually divided from the other two, the For-itself--as
temporality--must be a being which is actually undivided in
itself.

"m,

142.
450f • !N, 115, 119. Sartre's ontological characterization of the past as In-itself poses a bedrock problem. Though
Sartre does state at one point that the past "is at the same
time for-itself and in-itself," (HR, 119) this only complicates
what appears as an insolvable pro1i!'em.
460f • BN, 142. This view is reiterated numerous times
in Sartre's discussion of temporality (cf. HR, 107-49) and in
his consideration of the relation of freedom to the past (cf.
mI, 496-504).
47Of. ![, 142. Though Sartra admits that the For-itself
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The consideration of the ontological structure of the
For-itself in its various dimensions thus manifests the fundamental unity of the For-itself.

The For-itself is one, is

actually undivided in self, in the sense that it exists as an
interpenetration of distinct terms.

That the For-itself's mode

of unity is analogous to that of the In-i tsel! can be exemplified, moreover, by considering the unity o! a stone.

A stone,

too, is actually undivided in itself, but in the sense of an
inner cohesion of the same kind of matter admitting of no distinctions.

Hence, i! unity is predicated analogously, instead

of univocally, the Bartrean For-itself can be affirmed as one.
But this affirmation of an analogical unity for the For-itsel!
has been worked out in terms of a consideration of the ontological structure of the For-itself--a structure which pervades
each and every For-itself. 48 Bartre, however, seeks to express
a personal mode of unification for the individual For-itself.
Thus the unity of the For-itself requires further examination.
as present, as freedom, is independent of the past, he employs
"independence" here to convey the For-itself's power of selfdetermination and domination over the past, instead of to convey the present's independence in existence from the past. Cf.

!m..,

496-504.

48In addition to the various dimensions of the ontological structure of the For-itself considered, the consciousnessblJdy union offers a striking illustration of the For-itself' s
admission of distinction within unity. For, Bartre avers, the
For-itself exists its body, its body being its point of insertion in the world and point of view upon that world. Cf.
Part Two, Chapter II, 80-85.
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In repudiation of psychological methodology which
attempts to analyze man in terms of abstract, original givens,
Bartre asserts:
Either in looking for the person, we encounter a
useless, contradictory metaphYsical substance--or
else the being whom we seek vanishes in a dust of
phenomena bound together by external connections.
But what each one of us requires in his very effort
to comprehend another is that he should never have
to resort to this idea of substance which is inhuman
because it is well this side ot the human. Finally,
the fact is that the being considered does not
crumble into dust, and one can discover in him that
unity--for which substance was only a caricature-which must be a unity of responsibility, a unity
agreeable or hateful, blamable and praiseworthy, in
short personal. This unity, which is the being of
the man UDder consideration, is a free unification,
and this unification can not come atter a diversity
which it unifies. • • • this is the unIfication of
an ori~inal troject, a unification which should r2veal i selto us as a non-substantial absolute.4~
Thus, according to Bartre, I non-thetically affirm
undividedness in being by

~

freely unity my being in terms ot my original

ot being, my

pro~ect

actual

lived assumption of responsibility

for my past and future, as well as for my present.
pro~ect

~

Moreover, I

pro~ect,

to become God--the

pro~ect

my

which

stands as the meaning of my freely chosen, concrete ends--the
ends which I pursue in relating to my particular situation.

As

For-itself, then, I am a being whose concrete pro~ects reveal
the "original way"50 in which I have chosen my being, m::r way ot
relating to the world.

Hence, that a particular For-itself

117

asserts its personal unity in terms of its assumption of responsibility for its actions across its history, in terms of
its original project which stamps each of its concrete

pro~ectst

attests once more a Sartrean employment of an analogical notion
of unity for the For-itself.
Because Sartre views the For-itself as one across its

-

-

hi storz, the For-itself also emerges as a being having a type

of identity with itself, since identity is traditionally considersd as the sameness, the oneness ot a thing with itself at
two points of time or under different considerations. 51

over, because It as this For-itself, do not collapse

More-

in~o

the

being of the In-itself and the being of the Other, because I,
as this For-itself, am actually undivided in myself in virtue

ot the interpenetration of rrrr distinct "terms," it can be said:

"I am rrrrself."

But what concrete manifestations of self-

identity does the Sartrean For-itself reveal?
That the individual For-itself exists as a prereflective self-consciousness assuming its past and

pro~ecting

its future involves its grasp of its self-identity across its
history.

For example, if someone asks me what I did this after-

noon, I would immediately respond:

"I read a book." This

response reveals that I as present grasp this past "I" who read
the book as myself.

Moreover, that I express pride or shame for

51 0f • Klubertanz, Introduction!2.:!ill!. PhilosophY 2!
Being, 80, 92.
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my past actions, for those actions which are mine and define me
from behind, manifests that I grasp this past "I" who had freely
performed these actions as myself and thus assume responsibility
for these past actions.

Hence, what Bartre termed a "unity of

responsibility" emerges as an expression of my identity--my oneness with myself across my history.52
The Sartrean view of the For-itself's original project,
a project reflected in each of its concrete projects, further
attests the individual For-itself's oneness with self across its
history.

For, though I--as an individual For-itself--am per-

petually changing,

am

perpetually engaged in the process of

self-construction, these changes "are, nevertheless, changes
which I discover as changes 'in my lifet--that is, changes within the unitary compass of a single project,"53 my project to
become In-itself-For-itself, to become God. 54 My original
project thus, according to Bartre, remains the same throughout
my history.
There are, however, other concrete evidences of my selfidentity acknowledged by Sartre.

My perpetual constitution of

myself as !!2!. In-itself affirms my oneness with self across my
52There are numerous examples presented by Bartre in his
discussion of temporality which attest his affirmation of the
For-itself's self-identity. Cf.!N, 107-49.
53!!, 553.

54Cf • !!, 599.
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history.

Moreover, in my relation to the Other, in my reversal

ot the Other's look, I reinforce my seltness.

For, as Sartre

states ot my constitution ot myselt as not the Other:
This negation which constitutes my being and which,
as Hegel said, makes me appear as the Same confronting the Other, constitutes me on the ground ot a nonthetic selfness as "Myself." We need not understand
by this that a Self comes to dwell in our consciousness but that se1fness is reinforced by arising as a
negation of another se1fness and that this reinforcement is positively apprehended as the continuous
choice of selfness by itself as ~ same se1fness
and as this very se1fness. 55
In terms of my wresting myse1f-as-object from the look of the
Other and making the Other be object for me, I thus freely
choose to affirm this self which I am throughout the duration
of this relation, throughout my history.

Then, too, since my

body is lived by me as my insertion in the world of the Initself and the Other, since my body "represents the individualization of my engagement in the world, .,56 my body at every
point in my history "is present in every action. n57 Hence,
from several Bartrean perspectives (the particular For-itself's
original project; its assumption of responsibility for its past
and its future, as well as its present; its body as lived

55mJ,

28;.
~,;10.

Bartre avers that the For-itself is its own
individualIZation. Of.!N, ;10, 52;, 524, 599. In terms of
its'metapbysical birth, iEls For-itself upsurges as a nihilation
of a particular In-itself. Cf.![, 618.

57!!, ;24.
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throughout every action; its reinforcement of its very selfness
through its constitution of itself as not the In-itself or the
Other to which it relates), the individual For-itself manifests
itself as having a sameness. a oneness with itself across its
history.
The individual For-itself, then. can be said to have
what is traditionally termed a numerical identity--the basic
sameness of one and the same individual throughout its duration. 58 But the individual For-itself is refused the same mode
of identity as that of the In-itself.

For example. a

sto~e

hae

numerical identity in the sense that it remains the same
passive, congealed, homogeneous matter, admitting of no intrinsic development and fixed by its physical boundaries throughout
its duration.

The individual For-itself, however, has numerical

identity in the sense of a sameness with self against the backdrop of contrast, of perpetual change, of perpetual selfconstruction.

Its numerical identity, moreover, is dynamically,

though non-thetically, sustained across its history in terms of
this For-itself's perpetual choice of its selfness, in terms of
its perpetual renewal of its original project, in terms of its
perpetual awareness of its responsibility for its past, present
and future.

Thus the Sartrean For-itself does have a numerical

identity, but this identity must be predicated analogously.

58Cf • Klubertanz, Introduction.:!!2. ~ Philosophy 9.!.
Be ins , 80.
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Does the Sartrean For-itself, hovever, admit ot a
specific identity, an identiv,y which belongs to each and every
For-itself qua For-itself? To allow a facile w~ of distinguishing this inquiry from the preceding one, let us rephrase
this question.

Let us ask whether the For-itself has a struc-

tural determinateness which belongs to each and every Foritself qua For-itself.
in Being

~

Inasmuch as Sartre presents an ontology

Nothingness, an affirmative response can readily

be given to this question.

Every For-itself upsurges in the

world as a relation to In-itself.

Every For-itself emerges

sustaining the self-relations described in Chapter I of Part
Two.

Every For-itself exists its body.

Every For-itself is

consciousness, freedom, choice, nihilation, temporalization.
Sartre himself asserts:

As

"Naturally certain original structures

are invariable and in each For-itself constitute humanreality."59 Thus the For-itself, like the In-itsel~ emerges wit
a structural determinateness.

But, unlike the In-itself, unlike

the stone, the For-itself's very structural determinateness
casts the For-itself into the world as lack, as indeterminate,
as a being which is self-determining, as a being which forges
its own essence, as a being which t.t=mB,..k....e.-.s

~

himself

~

2!B.

gate,n60 as a being continually engaged in the process of selfconstruction.

Hence the For-itself's structural determinateness

59BN , 456.

-

60ml, 550.
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is such that the For-itself, unlike the stone, must be a selfdeterminining being, a being which seeks to escape its structure as lack, as indeterminateness, in a project forever unrealized.
Inasmuch as the For-itself has manifested itself as a
being having an analogous numerical identity and structural
determinateness, can it be concluded that the For-itself is also
characterized by permanence?

Prior to pursuing this question,

it should be recognized that the numerical identity of a particular For-itself is a lived "reaffirmation" of its sameness
with the self which is behind it in the past and the self which
is ahead of it in the future.

There must be such a dynamic,

non-thetic "reaffirmation" since the Sartrean For-itself exists
as flight trom its past and toward its future, exists as
temporalization, as perpetually Changing.6l

Similarly, in

accord with the Sartrean system, there must be a dynamic, though
no n-the tic , sustaining ot its very structural determinateness on
the part of the For-itselt, since its structural determinateness as lack 1s perpetuated only on the ground ot the Foritself's continual nihilat10n of In-itself to which it is
present. 62 Thus, while a mode of numerical identity and a mode
61 0f •

!!I, 323.

62Because the structural determinateness of the Foritself is perpetuated only on the ground of this For-itself's
nihilat10n of In-itself, the "for-itselt causes a human-reality
to exist as a species." (BN, 551)
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of structural determinateness come to rest upon the Sartrean
For-itself, they should not be so construed as to arrest the
inherent dynamism of the For-itself as temporalization.

But,

if this is the case, can permanence be attributed to the
Sartrean For-itself?
The Sartrean repudiation of permanence for the Foritself is staged against the backdrop of modern philosophy.
Citing specifically Leibniz and Kant, Sartre condemns their
consideration of the permanent as something apart from change,
In opposition to the tradition of modern philosophy, he more-

over, asserts:
The unity of change and the permanent is necessary
for the constitution of change as such. • •• It
must be a unity of beiltf. But such a unity of being
amounts to requiring t at the permanent be that
which changes, and hence the unity is at~e start
ekstatic and refers to the For-itself inasmuch as
the For-itself is essentially ekstatic being. • • •
Moreover resorting to permanence in order to furnish
the foundation for change is completely useless.
What Kant and Leibniz want to show is that an absolute change is no longer strictly speaking change
since it is no longer based on ~hing which
changes--or in relation to whic
ere is change.
But in fact if what changes is its former state in
the past mode, this is suffiCient to make permanence
superfluous. • •• Since this link with the past
replaces the pseudo-necessity of permanence, the
problem of duration can and ought to be posited in
relation to absolute changes. 6 3
Because Sal.'tre views the For-itself as temporally ekstatic,. as
continually changing (its future becoming its present and its
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present submerging into its past), he thus rejects any permanence that would render the For-itself a congealed, selfcoincident "what-it-is" across time.

.And yet, while he posits

absolute changes for the For-itself, he affirms that the Foritself which changes is its former state in the past mode.

This

suggests that there is some mode of enduring for the For-itself.
Furthering this viewpoint, moreover, is the Bartrean assertion
regarding the upsurge of a "new" present:

"We must guard

against seeing here the appearance of a new being.u64
too, Bartre avers:

Then.

"The for-itself endures in the form of a

non-thetic consciousness (of) enduring. n65

But, precisely,

what is the endurlng element of the For-itself?
IL cvnsidering the Bartrean answer to this question, it
can be discerned that Bartre is rejecting a given, passive
permanence for the For-itself.

For he states:

The For-itself is a temporalization. This means that
it is not but that it "makes itself." It is the situatIOn which must account for that substantial permanence which we readily recognize in people ("He has
not changed." "He is always the same.") and which
the person experiences empirically in most cases as
being his own. The free perseverance in a single
project does not imply any permanence; quite the contrary, it is a perpetual renewal of 1'11:3' engagement • • •

m,

64

147.

65sN, 150. Our considerations of the For-itself's
numerical rcfentity and structural determinateness are also suggestive of an enduring "element" for the For-itself, but they
do not bring into focus what Sartre views as the ultimate expression of the For-itself's enduring "element."
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On the other hand, the realities enveloped and illuminated by a project which develops and confirms itself
present the permanence of the in-itself; and to the
extent that they refer our image to us, they support
us with their everlastingness; in fact it frequently
happens that we take their permanence for our own. In
particular the permanence of place and enVironment.
of the judgments passed on us by our fellowmen, of
our past--all shape a degraded image of our perseverance. • •• It should be noted that this permanence
of the past, of the environment, and of character are
not given qualities; they are revealed on things ggly
in correlation with the continuity of my project.
According to Sartre, then, it is the individual's "free perseverance in a single project," a project perpetually renewed,
that constitutes an enduring nelement" throughout the individual's history.

Opposed to viewing the For-itself's permanence

as passive, as gi"'en, Sar'tre wields the dynamism, the spontaneity, the freedom of the For-itself to enunciate a type of
"permanence II which endure s only because the individual Foritself perpetually renews its way of being in the world, its
concrete expression of its project of being, at every point in
its history, at every point in its adventure of selfconstruction.

Hence. if predicated analogously, a type of

"permanence lt can be attributed to the For-itself, but it is a
permanence which is perpetually renewed across perpetual change.
It is not the same type of permanence which belongs to the Initself. to the stone; it is not a static, given endurance.
There remains for consideration one further characteristic ascribed to substance by the Aristotelian-Thomistic

6~, 551-52.
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tradition specifically:
ifications.

the capability to admit contrary qual-

The Sartrean For-itself, by definition, as the

being which is \'lhat it is not and is not what it is, assuredly
admits of such a capability..

Our very inquiry concerning the

sUbstantialization of the For-itself, moreover, confirms the
For-itsel!'s ability to admit contrary qualifications.

For this

inquiry has revealed the following observations regarding the
Sartrean For-itself:
(1) The For-itself is independent in its being
from the In-itself and the Other inasmuch as it does
not collapse into the being of the In-itself and the
Other to which it is present; yet this very independence is revealed across the For-itself's intrinsic
dependence upon the In-itself and the Other in its
perpetuation of itself as For-itself, as this Foritself.
(2) The For-itself is one inasmuch as it is
actually undivided in itself and divided from others
(independent); yet its very actual undividedness in
itself is revealed as a dynamic interpenetration of
its distinct "terms" or Itdimensions"; the very unity
of the For-itself is thus revealed across its inner
distances, across its inner "distinctions."
(3) The For-itself has numerical identity with
itself in the sense that it dynamically sustains a
sameness with self across its history in terms of its
assumption of responsibility for its past and its
future, as well as its present, and in virtue of its
perpetual renewal of its original choice of its being,
of its way of relating to the world; this very numerical identi~, however, is sustained across contrast-the contras afforded by its perpetual process of
self-construction, the contrast afforded by its inner
distances, the contrast afforded by its being as
temporalization.

(4) The For-itself has structural determinateness
inasmuch as each and every For-itself exists as a

12'7
relation to In-itself, exists its body, exists the
immediate structures of its self-relations, exists
as lack, freedom, nihilation, choice, temporalization--as consciousness; this very structural determinateness, however, is such that it allows se11determInation on the part of the individual Poritse1? who perpetuates it through nihilating the
In-itself; this structural determinateness, moreover is such that it is manI1ested as lack, as
indeterminateness, thereby revealing the For-itself
as a being whlch forges its own essence, which continually engages in the process of self-construction.
(5) The For-itself has permanence inasmuch as
it perpetually renews its original project, its
choice of its own way of relating to being, its
concrete expression of the project to become Initself-For-itself, this permanence, however, as
the perpetual renewal of a single project by the
free For-itself, is sustained across the history
of the For-itself, across its perpetually changing
being.

That the For-itself is a being capable of admitting contrary
qualifications is thus evinced by this reconsideration of its
other "substantial" characteristics. 6 ?
Summary

The investigation of the question as to whether Sartre
has substantialized the For-itself has hence shown that traditional characteristics of substance are assigned to the Sartrean For-itself.

But, as a general methodical practice

6?That the For-itself is capable of admitting contrary
qualifications could equally well be evinced by a reconsideration of the relations discussed in Part Two. But there is no
need to belabor a consideration of what is the most obvious
"~ubstantial" characteristic of the For-itself.
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stemming from his view of the For-itself as a dynamic, nihilating temporalization, Bartre disengages these characteristics-as predicated of the For-itself--from their traditional context
as the given.
tions;

This disengagement has two important implica-

(1) Sartre rejects outright the attempt of modern phi-

losophy to treat man as a given, insular, non-changing "whatit-is," to view man as substance in this sense, and (2) he repudiates any univocal predication of independence, unity,
identity, determinateness, permanence to man and In-itself.
Are we to conclude, then, that Bartre has substantialized the
For-itself on the basis of an analogical predication of substantial characteristics?

The answer to this question should

be delayed since there remains another approach to this issue.

CHAPTER II
THE FOR-ITSELF AS THE SOURCE

OF CATEGORIES

In an effort to gain further information concerning the

question of a Sartrean sUbstantialization ot the For-itselt, it
would be well to consider the ontological status ot the Foritself as it is actually operative in Sartre's account of the
origination ot categories ot being.
over, admits ot a dual strategy:

Such a consideration, more-

it provides us with another

approach to the issue of substantialization and it allows us
direct access to an examination ot the Sartrean manipulation ot
the For-itselt as the source of categories applicable to being.
This final investigation should thus be informative not only
with respect to the question ot a substantialization ot the Foritselt, but also with regard to the ultimate question concerning whether the For-itselt can bear the burden ot its ontological task ot issuing categories ot being.

It would, however,

be well to review the relationship ot these two questions and
the Sartrean thesis regarding the task ot the For-itself.
As discussed in Part one,l Sartre wields Spinoza's
dictum:

"All determination is negation" to claim that all de-

termination springs trom negation.
lCt. Part One, 24-25.

In the Sartrean system, then

Ct. BN, 180-86.
12

-
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the ontological burden of issuing all the determinations in the
world, of issuing categories of being, falls to the For-itself
since only the For-itself exists as negation.

Thus, relation,

space, motion, temporality, the one and the many, quality,
quantity, potentiality, instrumentality, beauty, value--all
come to the world through human reality.2

But the Sartrean

assignment of this ontological task to the For-itself poses a
question which can be formulated in the following way:

Can the

For-itself as relation bear the burden of issuing categories of
being applicable to a region of being so onto logically dissimila~

from it, to the region of In-itself, to the Sartrean

region of substance?
raising this question.

There are, moreover, two grounds for
First, within the Sartrean system, the

For-itself's dependence upon the In-itself confirms the ontological priority of the In-itself and yet the burdensome ontological task of originating categories falls to the For-itself.
This disproportion between the ontological priority of the Initself and the ontological functioning of the For-itself thus
gives cause for questioning the Sartrean perspective.

Secondly,

the lack of a common ground between the For-itself as relation

and the In-itself as substance appears to jeopardize Sartre's
employment of the For-itself as the source of categories of
being.

Both of these grounds for questioning the Sartrean

20f • !N, 180-216 for Sartre's discussion of the manner
in which human reality brings these determinations into the
world.
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thesis would, however, be mitigated somewhat if Bartre substantialized the For-itself. 3 Hence, as we approach a selective
consideration of categories issuing from the For-itselt~4 we
should be attentive not only to the question of the ontological
status of the For-itself, but also to the ultimate question of
the For-itself's capability to bear the ontological burden of
issuing categories of being.

It is the Bartrean view that the For-itself in relating
to In-itself causes the "this" to emerge against the backdrop
of the totality of undifferentiated In-itself.

As the corre,-

late of intentional activity, the lIthis," in other words, arises
across the ground
present 2

not. ,,5

of

the totality as "the being which I at

But what is the relation of quality to the

"thisll?
Defining quality as "nothing other than the being of the
this when it is considered apart from all external relation with
3It should be noted that an affirmation of the substantialization of the For-itself, if this be the conclusion, does
not necessarily imply the For-itself's capability to bear the
ontological burden of originating categories of being.

4It is neither necessary nor possible within the scope
of this thesis to consider all the categories which Sartre
views as issuing from the For-itself. An examination of quality, quantity and potentiality is sufficient for enunciating
the theme common to Sartre's wielding of the For-itself as the
source of all determination.

5!!i, 182.
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the world or with other thises,,,6 Sartre claims that the "this"
is nothing but the total interpenetration of its qualities.

To

illustrate this view, he avers that the yellow of a lemon is
its sourness and vice versa.

Not only is the lemon extended

throughout all its qualities, but each of its qualities is extended throughout each of the others.
external aspect of being.

Quali ty is thus not an

However, for there to be quality,

for the qualities of a being to be differentiated, requires the
presence of a For-itself.

But, specifically, how does the

"this" come to have distinctive qualities?

How does its un-

differentiated unity emerge as differentiated?
In answer to such questions, Sartre asserts:
It is the for-itself which can deny itself from various
points of view when confronting the this and which reveals the quality as a new this on the ground of the
thing. For each negating act by which the freedom of
the For-itself spontaneously constitutes its being,
there is a corresponding total revelation of being "in
profile." This profile is nothing but a relation of
the thing to the For-itself, a relation realized by
the For-itself. It is the absolute determination of
negativity, for it is not enough that the for-itself
by an original negation should not be being nor that
it should not be this being; in order for its determination as the nothIngness of being to be full, the
for-itself must realize itself as a certain unique
manner of not being this being. This absolute determination, which is the determination of quality
as a profile of th~ "this," belongs to the freedom
of the For-itself.'
According to Sartre, then, my perceiving this paper as white is

Gmi,
?BN

-'

186.
188.
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what reveals this quality across the undifferentiated unity of
this page.

Moreover, through such a perception, I am conscious-

ness of the impossibility of existing as color, as white, as a
what-it-is.

To perceive this color, then, involves my aware-

ness of self as the internal negation of this color, as not
this color, as other than this other, as independent.

I thus

come to know myself and to constitute my being by my free engagement with the "this," an engagement which is a determination
of quality, "the indication of what we are not and of the mode
of being which is denied to us."8

But what is the ontological

status of the For-itself as the source of determinations of
quality?
As manifested in the Sartrean discussion, the Foritself issues a determination of quality through a negating act
in terms of which its being is constituted.

As negation, the

For-itself thus constitutes itself as not the "this," as not
the particular quality, as denied "the mode of being" of the
quality, and hence as independent in its mode of being.

More-

over, in terms of its internal negation, the For-itself has an
awareness of self which manifests that it is a being with a
mode of identity and a mode of unity.

Hence, the For-itself, in

its issuance of the determination of quality, reveals itself as
having certain substantial characteristics which, of course,
8

m, 187.
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would have to be considered in the analogous context discussed
in the preceding chapter.
Quantity
As the "this" arises only through the intentional activity of the For-itselt, so, too, with the "this-that."
According to Bartre, however, not only do two "thises" emerge
against the backdrop ot the unditferentiated totality ot Initself through the negating act of the For-itself, but an external negation between the "this" and the "that" appears as
well through the For-itself's presence to being.

Yet, this

external negation between the "this" and the ttthat, tt Bartre
avers, belongs in no way to the "thises" considered.

That

there II a separation between "thises" hence constitutes only
an ideal separation which is simply what it is--an ideal separation In-itself--and which thus belongs neither to the being
of the For-itself nor to the baing of the flthises. fI

It is this

ideal separation In-itself which Bartre terms quantity.9
To illustrate his viaw of quantity as pure exteriority,
Bartre considers an example of counting--the making of "an
idaal distinction inside a totality capable ot disintegration
and already given. rt10

Ha claims that, it there are three men

conversing opposite ma, I do not count them in terms ot an

9Cf. BN, 189-91.

109,
-

-

191.

initial apprehension ot them as a group.

When I do count them

as three, the fact ot my counting, since it issues a purely external and negative relation among the members of the group, in
no wq ;jeopardizes the concrete unity ot the group; the group is
lett perfectly intact.

Thus "three" is not a concrete property

of the group, but neither is it a concrete property of the members of the group.

For, Sartre avers, we cannot speak of a:rJ'3'

member as "three" or even as a "third," since the quality of
"third" depends on the freedom of the For-itselt who is counting.

Each man .2!!\ be the "third," but being the "third" belongs

to the being ot no man, because it is an ideal character dependent upon the choice of the For-itself who is doing the
counting.

Hence, the For-itself's introduction of quantity adds

nothing to being but an ideal separation.

As Sartre states:

"It ~ti~ is isolated and detached from the surface of the
world as a reflection of nothingness cast on being."ll
~hat

the category of quantity, issued by the For-itself

in virtue of its relation to being, belongs neither to the being
of the For-itself nor to the being of the "thises" has serious
ram.1tications. 12 For it appears that, even though the Foritself continues to evince its independence in mode of being
tram the In-itselt as it originates categories and thus continues to manifest this chief "substantial" characteristic, it is
11H , 191.

12at.

H,

190-91.

l~

incapable--whether substantialized or not--to issue categories
having metaphysical import.

But this view requires further in-

vestigation.
Potentiality
In elucidating the manner in which the For-itself
brings certain potentialities to the In-itself, Sartre emphasizes his view of the For-itself as a being which is always
about to come to itself.

The importance of this view in the

present context lies in the fact that the For-itself, as the
internal negation of the In-itself to which it is present,
denies with the dimension of a future.

It is in terms of the

For-itself's relation to its future that potentialities come to
rest lightly upon In-itself to which the For-itself is present.
Permanence, for example, comes to the In-itself from the
future.

As Sartre states:

In so far as the for-itself denies itself in the
future, the this concerning which it makes itself
a negation is revealed as coming to itself from
the future. • •• The revelation of the table
as table requires a permanence of table which
comes to it from the future and-which is not a
purely established given, but a potentiality.13
Hence, because I consider the table within the dimension of my
relation to my future, a potentiality of permanence comes to
the table--a potentiality which is correlative to my future.
There are, however, other potentialities manifest in
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the "this."

For example, Bartre claims, the For-itself as a

relation to its future is beyond the crescent moon to which it
is present and thus the full moon becomes the potentiality of
the crescent moon.

This potentiality of the crescent, however,

remains purely external to it, since the crescent is fully what
it is and needs nothing other in order to be what it is--a
crescent.

Bartre maintains:

"Potentiality on the ground of

the future turns back on the this to determine it, but the relation between the this as ir.\-ilise1f and i ts potentiality is
an external re1ation."14 Pushing ahead this view of potentialities being in a state of indifference in relation to the
"this," he considers the example of an inkwell which
broken.

~

be

This potentiality of being shattered, however, is

totally cut off from the inkwell, because it is only the correlate of

~

possibility to shatter it.

In itself, Bartre

claims, "the inkwell is neither breakable nor unbreakable; it
It is thus the Sartrean thesis that potentiality comes
-is.,,15
to rest lightly on the In-itself as the meaning of being beyond
the present "this," as a meaning introduced in the world through
the intentional activity ot the For-itself.

As he states:

"Here again knowledge adds nothing to being and removes nothing
trom it; knowledge adorns it with no new quality.

1~, 196.

15!l, 196.

It causes
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being to-be-there by surpassing it toward a nothingness whioh
enters into only negative exterior relations with it. ttl6
Henoe, though the For-itself oasts its potent1alizing perspeotive upon the In-itself to whioh it relates, the In-itself
remains indifferent to suoh deposited potentialities.

The oat-

egory of potentiality thus appears as an ideal category issuing
from the intentional activity of the For-itself, the being
which, as "potentializer," manifests itself as independent in
the face of its dependence on the In-itself to which it is
present, as

~

in virtue of the interpenetration of its present

and future and as identical with self in the sense of grasping

its future self as a mode of its being, as its being to come.
Summary

On the grounds of thls selective consideration of categories emanating from the For-itself as it relates to the Initself, it can be ascertained that Sartre has again stooked the
For-itself with certain "substantial" oharacteristics, chief
among which is the For-itself's independence in mode of being
and as freedom, an independence revealed across the backdrop of

the For-itself's intrinsic dependence on In-itself.

It can,

moreover, be observed that Sartre has enoployed the For-itself to
issue categories of being which are only ideal categories, as
opposed to metaphysical categories.
Ih---BN,

-

197.

But such observations are
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not enough.

A stance must be taken upon the chief issues of

this thesis--the issue of the substantialization of the Foritself and the issue of the Sartrean employment of the Foritself as the source of categories of being.

PART FOUR

OONCLUSIONS:

THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 01 MAN AS RELATION

Our attempt to glean metaphysical implications from the
Sartrean theory of man as relation has been staged in terms of
questioning Bartre's employment of the For-itself to issue categories of being.

This ultimate question has afforded us

access not only to an inquiry concerning the meaning of the Foritself as relation, but also to the further question of a possible, Sartrean substantialization of the For-itself.

All these

questions, however, have been posed trom two perspectives which
demand comment.
First, from within the Sartrean system, it initially
appears paradoxical that the For-itself as relation should issue
categories of being which are applicable to the region of In1 tself, to the Bartrean region of ,substance.

How can the For--

itself, so onto logically dissimilar from the In-itself, be
manipulated by Sartre to draw out such categories!

That Sartre

assigns this task solely to the For-itself, however, has a
serious ramification for the Sartrean proclamation that the Foritself is relation, not substance.

For, what type of relation

is the For-itself if it can stand apart from the In-itself to
perform this ontological feat?

More pointedly, what type of

relation is the For-itself if it must stand apart from the Initself to which it relates, if it must
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the In-itself to
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which it relates, in order to originate categories?

,

Still

again, what type of relation is the For-itself if it manifests
~

independence in mode of being from the In-itself to which it

relates?

Since Sartre himself affirms independence as the chief

characteristic of substance,l there are grounds inherent in his
own system for considering whether he has substantialized the
For-itself.

Thus, each of the questions we have raised emerge

from tensions wi thin the Sartrean system itself.
There is, however, a second perspective from which the
principal questions of this thesis can be posed--the perspective
of the philosophic tradition.

Across the history of philosophy,

until relatively recent times, those who engaged in metaphysics
viewed a doctrine of substance as a central topic, if not the
pivotal doctrine, in the construction of a theory of being.
Substance rose t·') the forefront to perform a variety of metaphysical tasks dependent upon the particular metaphysical
system.

Relation, however, in general, was relegated to a rel-

atively insignificant role as an accidental modality of substance.

Thus, when Sartre, though admittedly not a meta-

physician, declares that the For-itself as relation issues
categories of being, the declaration engages the interest of
one nurtured in the metaphysical tradition recorded in the history of philosophy.

That Sartre, moreover, em.ploys the For-

itself to cause categories only adds further fuel to the

m, 506.

1
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interest of one metaphysically oriented. since he has thereby
placed a greater burden upon the For-itself as relation than
that placed upon substance by the traditional metaphysicians who
employ individual substances for purposes of discerning the
various 5ive~ modalities of beings.2 Hence, from the vantage
point of traditional metaphysics, the question concerning
whether the For-itself can bear the burden of issuing categories
and the inquiry regarding a possible, Sartrean substantializa-

tion of the For-itself quite naturally arise.
The principal issues of this thesis have thus been
posed from the dual perspective of the Sartrean system itself
and the general, metaphysical tradition.
spective are these issues to be resolved?

But from what perBecause the issues

which concern us arise from tensions within the Sartrean system,
it is necessar.1 to go beyond this system itself for answers.
Are we to look, then, to a traditional, metaphysical viewpoint
as a guideline for settling these questio:as?

Because the

Sartrean system, in our opinion, manifests both a certain originality and an advancement over past philosophic

sy~tems

in

some respects, it is also necessary to go beyond the context
2The tradition specifically referred to in this context
is the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. ~he contrast between
the Sartrean view of the For-itself as cause of categories and
the Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis of substances for purposes
of enunciating ~iven modalities of being suggests the px"ofound
difference in t eir employment of the phrase "categories of
belng,U the difference between ideal modalities and real modalities. But this difference will be dealt with in more detail
shortl •
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of a historical dialogue.

Thus, the conclusions reached with

regard to the questions of this thesis must come from our own
assessment of the Sartrean system and its contributions to a
perennial metaphysics.
~

Question

2! Substantialization

On the basis of the ground already traversed with
respect to this question, it should be evident that the Sartrean
refusal of substantiality for the For-itself pivots upon his
repudiation of a univocal predication of substance to all
beings.

To view both man and stone alike as an insular, to-

tally self-contained, non-changing what-it-is constitutes,
according to Sartre, the substantialist illusion to which
Descartes, Leibniz and Kant fell prey.

Working out of this

historical context, Sartre thus signals his rejection of such
sUbstantialism by declaring:

"The For-itself is relation."

And yet, as evidenced in our discussion of the characteristics

of the For-itself, it appears that substantial characteristics
do come to rest upon the For-itself if they be predicated
analogously.

Has Sartre, then, substantialized the For-itself

in an analogous fashion?
~

chief requirement which any "X" must meet in order

to be termed a .. substance" is an ability to stand apart from
other fiX'S. It

Both the philosophical tradition and Bartre

assess independence in being as the principal trait of any

145

substance, an assessment with which we concur.

To the extent,

then, that the For-itself constitutes itself as

~

the In-

itself to which it relates through knowledge and action, to the

to which it relates, to the extent that the For-itself

extent that the For-itself constitutes itself as not the Other
~

issue categories must constitute itself as

~

~

order

the In-itself

to which it relates, to the extent that the For-itself in seeking to grasp an In-itself always falls back upon itself as Foritself, it may be said that the For-itself is substantialized.
But why has Sartre failed to concede this substantialization?
The "failure" in this case appears to rest not with
Bartre, but with the metaphysical tradition.

Substantia1ist

philosophies have refused to admit internal relations as compatible with an independence in being.

Thus, since Bartre

claims that the For-itself is internally related to the world,
he could not, even if he so desired, term the For-itself "substance" in a traditional sense.
our experience?

But what of the substances in

Does experience evince the Sartrean view or

the traditionalist view?

Perhaps, a stone is not intrinsically

dependent upon other things; perhaps, a stone could
vacuum.

But what about me?

~

in a

I cannot exist even as a vegetable

in a vacuum; I need air and food to exist even on this minimal
level of animate life.

Since my continuance in existence hinges

on these necessities of life, I am in a very real sense intrinsically dependent upon them.

Moreover, as consciousness, I

1%

require objects to know; as freedom, I require something to
choose, something to act upon; as a being with possibles, I
require the world in order to gain a self-consciousness of what
I lack, in order to project my possibles.

I am thus intrinsi-

cally dependent upon things and others in the world.

And yet,

while I would not be this For-itself without such an internal
relationship, I do not collapse into the being of the things
to which I relate, of the Others to which I relate.
apart in the face of intrinsic dependence.

I stand

The employment of

experience as a sounding-board thus evinces the Sartrean reconciliation of an independence in being with an internal relatedness in the case of the For-itself.

Aside from the perspective

of traditional metapbysics, it can hence be maintained that the
For-itself is substantialized to the extent that it does stand
apart from others.

This position, however, can be maintained

only on the foundation of an analogous predication of substance,
of independence in being.

For, as I refuse a univocity of sub-

stance based on the being of stones, stones refuse a univocity
of substance based on being-for-itself.

In his polemic with

traditional substantialists who would admit only external relations as compatible with independence in being, Sartre has
thus shown metaphysicians that differing regions of being must
be examined before metaphysical conclusions are asserted and
that the analogous character of these assertions must be
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explicated and exemplified.
But what of the other traditional characteristics of
substance?

Though we have suggested ways in which the Sartrean

For-itself appears to manifest such traditional characteristics
as unity, identity, structural determinateness, permanence and
the admission of contrary qualifications, we must now assess
the precise relation of the Sartrean For-itself to the traditionalist view.'

Because Sartre considers the For-itself as

temporalization, as flight, he not only disengages such characteristics from the traditionalist stance of being givens, but
also disengages the For-itself from the notion of an enduring
subject.

This dual disengagement comes to cast a different

light upon the For-itself's "substantial" characteristics.
First, the For-itself's admission of contrary qualitications
must be here and now, since the For-itself is the present temporalizing itself.

Secondly, the unity and structural de-

terminateness ot the For-itself would have to be dynamically
asserted at every upsurge of the present.

Thirdly, the iden-

tity and "permanence" of the For-itself could not be considered
in traditionalist terms as the

It

same" and the "unchanged, It but

would have to be viewed from the perspective ot the continuity
of the For-itself across its history.

The In-itself character

of the past, however, emerges to create problems.

'Ct. Part Three, Chapter I, 112-27.

For the past

l~

as In-itself would appear to disrupt the unity of the For-itself
not only.on the level of temporal unity, but also on the levels
of the For-itself-body unity and the unity claimed in the act of
reflection, since both the body and the consciousness reflectedon are considered as in the immediate past.

Moreover, because

the past is the For-itself become In-itself, Sartre avers that
the For-itself as present undergoes absolute changes and yet
suggests a continuity of the For-itself across its history by
repudiating the appearance of a new being.

But how can the For-

itself be granted such continuity if the past as In-itself is
outside the For-itself as present, if the For-itself can wrench
itself from its past

~

nihilation, if the For-itself emerges

as though it were starting at zero in every present?

It would

thus appear that the For-itself cannot sustain even analogues
of traditionalist characteristics of substance.

Yet, Sartre's

concrete descriptions of the For-itself would enrich any substantialist perspective and, in a sense, it can be said that
the For-itself functions as if it were "substance," but without
foundation.
To clarify this view that the For-itself functions as
if it were "substance," but without foundation, it is necessary
to consider what we mean by "substance" in this context.

Cer-

tainly, the Sartrean For-itself does not function as if it were
a Cartesian substance.

Certainly, the Sartrean For-itself re-

fuses any notion of substance predicated univocally of man and
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stone.

And yet, Sartre's rich descriptions of the For-itself

are suggestive of a certain view of "substance" which must now
be enunciated.
What do we mean by "substance"?

Consider first a stone.

This stone, to the extent that it stands apart from other
actualities, to the extent that its physical boundaries mark it
off from the grass, has an independence in actuality.

The con-

gealed, solidified state of its matter, moreover, is indicative
of an actual undiv1dedness or unity.

Then, too, its retention

of its matter and boundaries across time manifests a continuity
with itself. 4 That the stone is a certain type of matter,
furthermore, indicates a structural determinateness.

In the

case of the stone, these characters, however, are given; the
stone in no way acts to sustain its independence, unity, continuity and structural determinateness.

Because its structural

determinateness is given in completion, the stone, moreover,
admits of only external relation.s, admits of only extrinsic
dependence upon others.

The torce of rain, for example, can

move the stone to another place on a hill, as well as make it
wet.

Yet these conditions rest lightly on the stone, since its

integrity as this stone requires no intrinsic dependence upon
others.

But so much for the stone.

4The notion ot continuity is being introduced as a substitute tor the traditional notion of identity in order to allo
a departure trom the traditional metaphysical implications ot
the notion of sameness.
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What allows me to call

mysel~

"substance"?

To the ex-

tent that I am bodied, I, like the stone, have physical boundaries which mark me off from other actualities.
pendence is a given.

This inde-

I, however, unlike the stone, have another

level of independence--my freedom.

I come into the world as an

actuality with the potential of self-determination.
potential is a given, my actuation of it is not.

Though this

It is I who

am continually engaging in the process of self-construction
my free acts.

~

Each act, as free, is a further realization of my

selfhood and to that extent a further realization of my standing
apart from others.

Hence, my independence is affirmed at

various levels--as a given physical independence, as a given
potential of self-determination, and as

~~

independence forged

by myself in the further realization of my selfhood.
My independence, unlike that of the stone, however, is
such that it is compatible with my intrinsic dependence upon
other actualities.

That I, unlike the stone, require internal

relations to other actualities is rooted in my structural determinateness.
wi~h

Though I came into the world, like the stone,

a given structural determinateness, my structural deter-

minateness is a given potential, a potential with a given limit.
I came into the world as an actuality given the potential for
realizing the perfection of myself as a rational

an1~l;

to be

this rational animal in the state of completion, as this stone
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is a stone in the state ot completion, is my given limit and
goal.

In order to actuate my consciousness, my freedom, in

order to engage in the process of self-realization, I, however,
require the world.
upon.

I require other actualities to know, to act

I require other "I'stl to communicate with, to love.

I

require the world in order to realize my concrete possibles
which arise in terms of my project to attain my given limit.

I

require the world, then, to concretize the given structural determinateness wl'.t:f.ch I exist.

The world thus stands as the

source of data for my self-construction, for m::r self-realization
of this given potential, for my furthering my individualized
approach to the given 11m!t.

Hence, though I am independent, I

am intrinsically dependent upon other actualities in the process
of realizing my given potential, in the process of constructing
myself.
If I am continually in the process of selt-realization,
it I am perpetually changing, have I no identity with selt?
Do I not have a basic sameness with self' across my history?

To

the extent that I am perpetually furthering my approach to a
given limit, I cannot say that I am the same "I" that I was ten
years ago, ten minutes ago.

I can and do express, however, a

continuity with that I of ten years ago because I today am a
turther dewlopment ot that I of ten years ago.

Tha:b I assume

responsibility tor the actions ot this past I, moreover,
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indicates a continuity.

A theory of continuity, however, de-

mands a theory of time which admits of the past as given in the

.

present.

A man who had a heart attack two years ago takes

certain precautions today because the body of today

~s

a

further development of the body of two years ago and thus has
an inherent heart condition.

Then, too, a person who speaks of

having a deeper understanding or a deeper love of someone indicates a cumulative act, indicates the immanence of the past in
the present.

That the past is immanent in the present, more-

over, need not swallow up my freedom.

For, while my past is

immanent in my present, I, as present, am relating to the world
of today, a world in terms of which I can

pro~ect

new concrete

possibles, a world offerins novel data for my process of selfconstruction.

The novelty of the present. in other words,

precludes its immanence in my past and thereby precludes the
,functioning ot my past as a determinant of my present actions.
A theory of continuity, worked out in terms of the notion of
the immanence of the past in the present, can be applied then
to a tree actuality, to the "I."

There are thus several ways

in which my continuity across my history can be expressed.
the extent that I am a selt-realizing

actuali~,

To

it is I who

ngive" continuity across my history to the given potential
which constitutes my structural determinateness, for it is I
who further the actualization of that given potential.

To the
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extent that my past is immanent in my present, providing with
my present a backdrop for my future, my continuity is again

secured.

In other words, to the extent that I do not emerge in

every present as though I were starting at zero, the immanence
of my past in my present is a given.

Yet, as a conscious, free

actuality, I can assert my continuity across my history by
acknowledging responsibility for my actions--past, ,as well as
present.

Unlike myself, the stone, however, has only a sheer

given continuity across time.
Inasmuch as my determinate structure is a given potential, I thus exist as the actualization of that potential.
My structural determinateness cannot be construed as an element
of sameness, of permanence, throughout change, since as a potential is furthered from day to day, from moment to moment, I
cannot say that I have the same structural determinateness that
I had ten years ago, ten minutes ago.

To assert with the

Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, tor example, that I remain
specifically the same across my history is either to do metaphysics on a formalistic level or to take me for a stone---or,
perhaps, both.

Are we to say, then, that there is no permanent

element, no element of sameness across my history?

There is an

element of sameness, there is an unchanged element:

the given

limit, but It across my history, only further my approach to
this limit; I never attain it.

What is this limit which

.154

functions simultaneously as a goal?

Self-completion, self-

fulfillment, self-perfection in the sense of having attained the
total actualization of my given potential, in the sense of
having no more options because I have realized all!

Because

this limit and goal cannot be attained by me, because this limit
and goal can only be approached, my determinate structure, un-

like that of the stone, remains open, to be closed only by my
death and even then as incomplete.
What of my unity?

To what extent am I actually un-

divided in self?

I appear in the world as a consciousness ex-

isting its body.

This unity is a given and yet a given which is

a potential for continuation or division.

Unlike the stone,

then, I must eat, drink and so on to sustain this unity.

I,

as consciousness, as a self-determining actuality, also manifest my unity in terms of my continued actualization of a given
potential, in terms of a single, cumulative endeavor.

To the

extent that my past is immanent in my present, providing with
my

present a backdrop for my future, my selfhood permeates my

temporal dimensions at each degree of its realization.

Then,

too, since I acknowledge responsibility for my actions across
my

hietor-y, I affirm.

TJJ.y

oneness.

Finally, because my multiple

activities in my process of self-construction are ordered to a
single limit and goal, self-completion, my unity is again
attested.
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Having considered the stone and myself as "substances,"

we must summarize our requirements for "substance.tI

A substance

is an actuality which can stand apart from other actualities,
thoug~

not to the exclusion of a relatedness to others (external

in the case of the stone; internal, as well as external in the

case of

~self).

A substance is an actuality existing a given

determinate structure (complete in the case of the stone; a
given potential in the case of myself).

A substance, finally,

is an actuality having unity and continuity across time (given
in the case of the stone; with both given and self-determined
features in the case of

~self).

Buch are our requirements for

predicating "substance" of an "X."

That "substance" must be

predicated analogously of the stone and

~self

is, moreover,

our contention.
We can now clarify our view that the Sartrean Foritself functions as if it were "substance," in the preceding
sense, but without foundation.

Certainly Bartre's general

perspective and rich descriptions regarding the For-itself suggest that Bartre acknowledges the fact of the For-itself's
structural determinateness, unity, continuity and independence.
Yet

th~

ramifications of the Sartrean ontology are such that

minimally the "fact tl of the For-itselfts unity and continuity
is without foundation.

Because Bartre avers that the past is

the For-itself become In-itself, because he views the For-itself

l~

and the In-itself as antithetical, he cannot ground the temporal
unity or the continuity of the For-itself as For-itself.

For

such unity or continuity is disrupted by his insistence that the
For-itself as freedom, as spontaneity, can wrench itself from
its past, can start, as it were, at zero with the upsurge of
each present.

That the past, for Bartre, is outside the pres-

ent, that the past is In-itself in character, moreover, poses a
question as to whether he can ground ontologically the unity of
the For-itself in the act of reflection and the bodyconsciousness unity.

Sartra's refusal of an immanence of the

past in the present, however, is but one instance of Bartre's
general repudiation of admitting givens as immanent within the
For-itself.

Even the structural determinateness of the For-

itself as lack is such that it is not given, but perpetually
renewed by the present For-itself.

This general repudiation of

the immanence of givens in the present For-itself thus renders
the For-itself a being which is pure spontaneity, which is absolute freedom, and which hence can stand apart from the Initself to which it relates.

But, while its spontaneity, its

freedom, its nih1lating activity, secure the For-itself's
ability to stand apart from the In-itself, these very characters work to undermine the For-itself's continuity, to call into
question certain levels of the For-itself's unity and to burden
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the For-itself with the sheer selt-determination of its structural determinateness as lack.

We thus conclude that the In-

itself character of the past and the absolute freedom of the
For-itself as present work against each other so as to preclude
an ontological foundation for affirming that the For-itself is
"substance."

If Sartre would simultaneously give more weight

to his notion of facticity

and

temper the freedom of the For-

itself. then perhaps a substantialized For-itself would emerge.
But such a For-itself does not emerge from the pages of Being

~ Nothingness. 5
~

For-itself

~

Categories .2L Being

Our original question to Sartre was:

Oan the For-

itself. as relation. bear the ontological burden of issuing
categories of being?

As we reconsider our selective treatment

of the categories of quality. quantity and potentiality. we
recognize a peculiar twist to this inquiry.

For, whether the

For-itself can bear the burden or not, the categories have no
metaphysical import for the In-itself.

According to Bartre, no

category can "appear as an objective characteristic of the
thing, if we understand by objective that which by nature belongs to the in-itself--or that which in one way or another

50f• W. Desan, The TrafiC Finale, 144--59 for a consideration of the unity ana-fdent tY of the For-itself but from
the standpoint of the Sartrean repudiation of the Ego.
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really constitutes the object as it is."6 And, again, he maintains that the categories issued by the For-itself are only
tithe ideal mixing of things which leaves them wholly intact,
without either enriching or impoverishing them by one iota;
they merely indicate the infinite diversity of ways in which the
freedom of the for-itself can realize the indifference of
being. n7 Hence, in virtue of Sartre's limited and impoverished
view of the region of non-human things, of the region of Initself, the For-itself's issuance of categories can have no
metaphysical import tor the In-itself.
But the question still remains as to whether the Foritself can bear the burden of issuing categories which Bartre
labels "ideal"?

In attempting to answer this question, it

should be noted that the Bartrean reference to ideality is a
limited one.

For Sartre is not suggesting that the categories

are merely subjective whims of the For-itself.

He explicitly

asserts that the For-itself's issuance of the categories "can
not be a way of disposing and of classifying phenomena vb-i.ch
would exist only as subjective phantoms, nor can it 'subjectivize' being in so far as its revelation is constitutive of the
For-its$lf. n8 Ref\lsing a radical subjectivism, Bartra thus
claims that the

For~,i

~, 185.
7BN

-'

191-92.

8!!" 185.

tself' s issuance of categories requires the
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For-itse1f's presence to a "this," to a brute In-itself.

What,

then, is the status of the categories? Neither subjective nor
objective, the categories, Bartre maintains, "remain 'in the
air,' exterior to the For-itself as well as to the In-itse1f. n9
Hence, the Bartrean categories are modalities of meaning thrust
upon the brute In-itself by the For-itself as a result of the
For-itse1f's presence to a "this." Exterior to the being of
the For-itself, exterior to the being of the In-itself, the
Bartrean categories thus cannot be construed to have metaphysical significance as modalities of being.
In view of the foregoing, it can be said that a metaphySical import cannot come to rest upon the Bartrean categories whether the For-itself be affirmed "substance" or "relation."

Moreover, the For-itself can in no way bear the

burden of issuing even the Bartrean categories, even modalities
of meanjng.

No theoretical argument, however,
.. would have any

force against the Bartrean thesis.

What do we mean by this?

To the extent that we are presence to the world, we cannot remove ourselves from the world to test the Bartrean option that
the region of In-itself is undifferentiated without the presence
of the For-itself.
option.

Thus we

But neither can Bartre evince such an

and.

Bartre must evince our stances on the con-

crete ground of being present to In-itself.

9BN, 185.

-

From this common
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ground, we ask Sartre onlY' one question:

If the In-itself is

undifferentiated, if the categories "merely indicate the infinite diversity of ways in which the freedom of the for-itself
can ~ealize the indifference of being,nlO what is the foundation for this page being categorized as rectangular, as white,
as destructible by two or ten or one hundred free For-itselfs?
In order to account for our common experiences of "thises," it
appears that more is required by way of foundation than spontaneity confronting indifference.

Hence, we maintain that the

For-i tself cannot bear the burden of issuing the Sartrean categories.
~

Sartrean Contributions

~~Perennial

MetaphYsic

In drawing our study to a close, it would be well to
point out the insights afforded by Sartre for a perennial metaphysic.

We suggest that Sartre is thrusting a challenge upon

contemporary metaphysicians:

to do metaphysics at the level

of the concrete existent, instead of the formalistic level.
This general Sartrean challenge can be formulated, moreover, in
very specific

~erms.

Sartre has done well to challenge tra-

ditional, sUbstantialist philosophies which predicate "substance" univocally of all actualities.

While it is true that

Aquinas and Descartes suggest a non-univocal predication of
"substance" with regard to God and finite things, both fail to

l~, 192.
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go beyond a univocity or substance in dealing with the finite.
Though analogy is writ large across the Thomistic system, an
explication of the analogous character of substance as applied
to the various levels or being is virtually non-existent.

This

general failure or substantialist philosophies not only strips
their doctrines of substance of any relevance to the concrete,
but also leads to the positing of other doctrines equally irrelevant.

For example, the traditional, sUbstantialist position

that independence in mode of being precludes internal relatedness cannot stand the test of experience, as Bartre has shown.
unless the metaphysician base his doctrine ot being upon the
being ot stones.

Then, too. as Bartre has pointed out. the

traditional. substantialist doctrine of change which claims an
element ot sameness throughout change actually nullifies the
very meaning of change.

To consider substance the unchanged is

to deny change and to relegate time. moreover. to the arena of
a mathematical abstraction.

Though it is true that the Thomis-

tic tradition. with respect to the problem of change, views substance as a potential principle actualized by accidental forms,
the inherent formalism ot that tradition comes to arrest the
significance ot substance as a potential principle with its
pronouncement that the thing remains the same what-it-is. remains the same substantially, since such a pronouncement denies
that the potential is the actualized.

It appears, then, that
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Sartre has well-directed his attack upon traditional, substantialist systems by pointing to the serious implications
which metaphysical formalism has upon such doctrines as those
of substance, relation, change and time.

But, in summary,

what are we to say of the Sartrean metaphysical insights?
Sartre was led to a repudiation of a univocity of substance, to a reconciliation of independence in being with internal relatedness, to a reconsideration of theories of change
and time !.!!. terms 2!.

!!!2. analysis 2.t human

realiY.

The Sar-

trean system thus suggests that a more meaningful and more
realistic metaphysics could be had if metaphysicians would
utilize man as a starting-point in their metaphysical investigations and work down the hierarchy of being to the level of
the inanimate, if metaphysicians would actually work out the
analogy of being.

It is hence our conclusion that Sartre t s

critique of traditional metaphysics is acutely perceptive and
should lead to a more productive metaphysics than the formalistic systems of the past, if it be given a hearing.ll

llThe work of John Wild, The Challenge ot Existentialism (Bloomington: Indiana UniverSItY Press, 19"59') show:a be
CIted as an excellent attempt to show the continuity of existentialist themes with traditional themes and thereby to
locate the existentialist movement within the realm of serious,
philo sophic thought.
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